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T1560 Archive Collected Data

An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.

Both compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.

Item Value
ID T1560
Sub-techniques T1560.001, T1560.002, T1560.003
Tactics TA0009
Platforms Linux, Windows, macOS
Version 1.0
Created 20 February 2020
Last Modified 04 January 2022

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0045 ADVSTORESHELL ADVSTORESHELL encrypts with the 3DES algorithm and a hardcoded key prior to exfiltration.20
S0331 Agent Tesla Agent Tesla can encrypt data with 3DES before sending it over to a C2 server.16
S0622 AppleSeed AppleSeed has compressed collected data before exfiltration.39
G0007 APT28 APT28 used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents on the DCCC and DNC networks.44
G0050 APT32 APT32‘s backdoor has used LZMA compression and RC4 encryption before exfiltration.45
S0456 Aria-body Aria-body has used ZIP to compress data gathered on a compromised host.30
G0001 Axiom Axiom has compressed and encrypted data prior to exfiltration.42
S0093 Backdoor.Oldrea Backdoor.Oldrea writes collected data to a temporary file in an encrypted form before exfiltration to a C2 server.36
S0521 BloodHound BloodHound can compress data collected by its SharpHound ingestor into a ZIP file to be written to disk.43
S0657 BLUELIGHT BLUELIGHT can zip files before exfiltration.23
S1039 Bumblebee Bumblebee can compress data stolen from the Registry and volume shadow copies prior to exfiltration.17
S0454 Cadelspy Cadelspy has the ability to compress stolen data into a .cab file.26
S0667 Chrommme Chrommme can encrypt and store on disk collected data before exfiltration.40
S0187 Daserf Daserf hides collected data in password-protected .rar archives.31
G0035 Dragonfly Dragonfly has compressed data into .zip files prior to exfiltration.55
S0567 Dtrack Dtrack packs collected data into a password protected archive.41
S0367 Emotet Emotet has been observed encrypting the data it collects before sending it to the C2 server. 7
S0363 Empire Empire can ZIP directories on the target system.2
S0091 Epic Epic encrypts collected data using a public key framework before sending it over the C2 channel.37 Some variants encrypt the collected data with AES and encode it with base64 before transmitting it to the C2 server.38
S0343 Exaramel for Windows Exaramel for Windows automatically encrypts files before sending them to the C2 server.13
S0267 FELIXROOT FELIXROOT encrypts collected data with AES and Base64 and then sends it to the C2 server.11
G0037 FIN6 Following data collection, FIN6 has compressed log files into a ZIP archive prior to staging and exfiltration.53
S0249 Gold Dragon Gold Dragon encrypts data using Base64 before being sent to the command and control server.8
G0004 Ke3chang The Ke3chang group has been known to compress data before exfiltration.52
S0487 Kessel Kessel can RC4-encrypt credentials before sending to the C2.15
S0356 KONNI KONNI has encrypted data and files prior to exfiltration.21
G0032 Lazarus Group Lazarus Group has compressed exfiltrated data with RAR and used RomeoDelta malware to archive specified directories in .zip format, encrypt the .zip file, and upload it to C2. 495051
G0065 Leviathan Leviathan has archived victim’s data prior to exfiltration.46
S0395 LightNeuron LightNeuron contains a function to encrypt and store emails that it collects.9
S0681 Lizar Lizar has encrypted data before sending it to the server.14
G1014 LuminousMoth LuminousMoth has manually archived stolen files from victim machines before exfiltration.54
S0010 Lurid Lurid can compress data before sending it.10
S0409 Machete Machete stores zipped files with profile data from installed web browsers.29
G0045 menuPass menuPass has encrypted files and information before exfiltration.4748
S0198 NETWIRE NETWIRE has the ability to compress archived screenshots.12
G0040 Patchwork Patchwork encrypted the collected files’ path with AES and then encoded them with base64.43
S0517 Pillowmint Pillowmint has encrypted stolen credit card information with AES and further encoded it with Base64.27
S1012 PowerLess PowerLess can encrypt browser database files prior to exfiltration.18
S0113 Prikormka After collecting documents from removable media, Prikormka compresses the collected files, and encrypts it with Blowfish.28
S0279 Proton Proton zips up files before exfiltrating them.25
S0375 Remexi Remexi encrypts and adds all gathered browser data into files for upload to C2.6
S0253 RunningRAT RunningRAT contains code to compress files.8
S0445 ShimRatReporter ShimRatReporter used LZ compression to compress initial reconnaissance reports before sending to the C2.5
S0586 TAINTEDSCRIBE TAINTEDSCRIBE has used FileReadZipSend to compress a file and send to C2.22
S0257 VERMIN VERMIN encrypts the collected files using 3-DES.19
S0515 WellMail WellMail can archive files on the compromised host.35
S0658 XCSSET XCSSET will compress entire ~/Desktop folders excluding all .git folders, but only if the total data size is under 200MB.24
S0251 Zebrocy Zebrocy has used a method similar to RC4 as well as AES for encryption and hexadecimal for encoding data before exfiltration. 323334

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1047 Audit System scans can be performed to identify unauthorized archival utilities.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0017 Command Command Execution
DS0022 File File Creation
DS0009 Process Process Creation
DS0012 Script Script Execution

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