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T1119 Automated Collection

Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a Command and Scripting Interpreter to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. In cloud-based environments, adversaries may also use cloud APIs, command line interfaces, or extract, transform, and load (ETL) services to automatically collect data. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools.

This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Lateral Tool Transfer to identify and move files, as well as Cloud Service Dashboard and Cloud Storage Object Discovery to identify resources in cloud environments.

Item Value
ID T1119
Sub-techniques
Tactics TA0009
Platforms IaaS, Linux, SaaS, Windows, macOS
Version 1.1
Created 31 May 2017
Last Modified 11 April 2022

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0622 AppleSeed AppleSeed has automatically collected data from USB drives, keystrokes, and screen images before exfiltration.8
G0006 APT1 APT1 used a batch script to perform a series of discovery techniques and saves it to a text file.38
G0007 APT28 APT28 used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents on the DCCC and DNC networks.45
S0438 Attor Attor has automatically collected data about the compromised system.25
S0128 BADNEWS BADNEWS monitors USB devices and copies files with certain extensions to a predefined directory.37
S0239 Bankshot Bankshot recursively generates a list of files within a directory and sends them back to the control server.12
S1043 ccf32 ccf32 can be used to automatically collect files from a compromised host.7
G0114 Chimera Chimera has used custom DLLs for continuous retrieval of data from memory.39
S0244 Comnie Comnie executes a batch script to store discovery information in %TEMP%\info.dat and then uploads the temporarily file to the remote C2 server.14
G0142 Confucius Confucius has used a file stealer to steal documents and images with the following extensions: txt, pdf, png, jpg, doc, xls, xlm, odp, ods, odt, rtf, ppt, xlsx, xlsm, docx, pptx, and jpeg.48
S0538 Crutch Crutch can automatically monitor removable drives in a loop and copy interesting files.11
S0363 Empire Empire can automatically gather the username, domain name, machine name, and other information from a compromised system.1
G0053 FIN5 FIN5 scans processes on all victim systems in the environment and uses automated scripts to pull back the results.44
G0037 FIN6 FIN6 has used a script to iterate through a list of compromised PoS systems, copy and remove data to a log file, and to bind to events from the submit payment button.4041
C0001 Frankenstein During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to automatically gather the username, domain name, machine name, and other system information.1
S1044 FunnyDream FunnyDream can monitor files for changes and automatically collect them.7
G0047 Gamaredon Group Gamaredon Group has deployed scripts on compromised systems that automatically scan for interesting documents.47
S0597 GoldFinder GoldFinder logged and stored information related to the route or hops a packet took from a compromised machine to a hardcoded C2 server, including the target C2 URL, HTTP response/status code, HTTP response headers and values, and data received from the C2 node.28
S0170 Helminth A Helminth VBScript receives a batch script to execute a set of commands in a command prompt.24
S0260 InvisiMole InvisiMole can sort and collect specific documents as well as generate a list of all files on a newly inserted drive and store them in an encrypted file.3031
G0004 Ke3chang Ke3chang has performed frequent and scheduled data collection from victim networks.49
S0395 LightNeuron LightNeuron can be configured to automatically collect files under a specified directory.35
G0045 menuPass menuPass has used the Csvde tool to collect Active Directory files and data.46
S0443 MESSAGETAP MESSAGETAP checks two files, keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt, for instructions on how to target and save data parsed and extracted from SMS message data from the network traffic. If an SMS message contained either a phone number, IMSI number, or keyword that matched the predefined list, it is saved to a CSV file for later theft by the threat actor.29
S0455 Metamorfo Metamorfo has automatically collected mouse clicks, continuous screenshots on the machine, and set timers to collect the contents of the clipboard and website browsing.36
S0339 Micropsia Micropsia executes an RAR tool to recursively archive files based on a predefined list of file extensions (.xls, .xlsx, .csv, .odt, .doc, .docx, .ppt, .pptx, .pdf, .mdb, .accdb, .accde, *.txt).20
G0129 Mustang Panda Mustang Panda used custom batch scripts to collect files automatically from a targeted system.43
S0699 Mythic Mythic supports scripting of file downloads from agents.2
S0198 NETWIRE NETWIRE can automatically archive collected data.26
G0049 OilRig OilRig has used automated collection.50
C0014 Operation Wocao During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a script to collect information about the infected system.53
S1017 OutSteel OutSteel can automatically scan for and collect files with specific extensions.15
G0040 Patchwork Patchwork developed a file stealer to search C:\ and collect files with certain extensions. Patchwork also executed a script to enumerate all drives, store them as a list, and upload generated files to the C2 server.37
S0428 PoetRAT PoetRAT used file system monitoring to track modification and enable automatic exfiltration.10
S0378 PoshC2 PoshC2 contains a module for recursively parsing through files and directories to gather valid credit card numbers.3
S0238 Proxysvc Proxysvc automatically collects data about the victim and sends it to the control server.23
S0458 Ramsay Ramsay can conduct an initial scan for Microsoft Word documents on the local system, removable media, and connected network drives, before tagging and collecting them. It can continue tagging documents to collect with follow up scans.9
S0684 ROADTools ROADTools automatically gathers data from Azure AD environments using the Azure Graph API.5
S0090 Rover Rover automatically collects files from the local system and removable drives based on a predefined list of file extensions on a regular timeframe.32
S0148 RTM RTM monitors browsing activity and automatically captures screenshots if a victim browses to a URL matching one of a list of strings.3334
S0445 ShimRatReporter ShimRatReporter gathered information automatically, without instruction from a C2, related to the user and host machine that is compiled into a report and sent to the operators.4
G0121 Sidewinder Sidewinder has used tools to automatically collect system and network configuration information.52
S0491 StrongPity StrongPity has a file searcher component that can automatically collect and archive files based on a predefined list of file extensions.22
S0098 T9000 T9000 searches removable storage devices for files with a pre-defined list of file extensions (e.g. * .doc, .ppt, .xls, .docx, .pptx, *.xlsx). Any matching files are encrypted and written to a local user directory.18
S0467 TajMahal TajMahal has the ability to index and compress files into a send queue for exfiltration.6
G0027 Threat Group-3390 Threat Group-3390 ran a command to compile an archive of file types of interest from the victim user’s directories.42
G0081 Tropic Trooper Tropic Trooper has collected information automatically using the adversary’s USBferry attack.51
S0136 USBStealer For all non-removable drives on a victim, USBStealer executes automated collection of certain files for later exfiltration.21
S0476 Valak Valak can download a module to search for and build a report of harvested credential data.27
S0257 VERMIN VERMIN saves each collected file with the automatically generated format {0:dd-MM-yyyy}.txt .13
S0466 WindTail WindTail can identify and add files that possess specific file extensions to an array for archiving.19
S0251 Zebrocy Zebrocy scans the system and automatically collects files with the following extensions: .doc, .docx, ,.xls, .xlsx, .pdf, .pptx, .rar, .zip, .jpg, .jpeg, .bmp, .tiff, .kum, .tlg, .sbx, .cr, .hse, .hsf, and .lhz.1617

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1041 Encrypt Sensitive Information Encryption and off-system storage of sensitive information may be one way to mitigate collection of files, but may not stop an adversary from acquiring the information if an intrusion persists over a long period of time and the adversary is able to discover and access the data through other means. Strong passwords should be used on certain encrypted documents that use them to prevent offline cracking through Brute Force techniques.
M1029 Remote Data Storage Encryption and off-system storage of sensitive information may be one way to mitigate collection of files, but may not stop an adversary from acquiring the information if an intrusion persists over a long period of time and the adversary is able to discover and access the data through other means.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0017 Command Command Execution
DS0022 File File Access
DS0012 Script Script Execution

References

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