T0867 Lateral Tool Transfer
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. 1 Copying of files may also be performed laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares. 1
In control systems environments, malware may use SMB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally through industrial networks.
Item | Value |
---|---|
ID | T0867 |
Sub-techniques | |
Tactics | TA0109 |
Platforms | Control Server, Data Historian, Human-Machine Interface |
Version | 1.1 |
Created | 21 May 2020 |
Last Modified | 09 March 2023 |
Procedure Examples
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
C0025 | 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a VBS script to facilitate lateral tool transfer. The VBS script was used to copy ICS-specific payloads with the following command: cscript C:\Backinfo\ufn.vbs C:\Backinfo\101.dll C:\Delta\101.dll 7 |
S0606 | Bad Rabbit | Bad Rabbit can move laterally through industrial networks by means of the SMB service. 3 |
S1045 | INCONTROLLER | INCONTROLLER can use a Telnet session to load a malware implant on Omron PLCs.56 |
S0368 | NotPetya | NotPetya can move laterally through industrial networks by means of the SMB service. 3 |
S0603 | Stuxnet | Stuxnet sends an SQL statement that creates a table and inserts a binary value into the table. The binary value is a hex string representation of the main Stuxnet DLL as an executable file (formed using resource 210) and an updated configuration data block. 4 |
S0366 | WannaCry | WannaCry can move laterally through industrial networks by means of the SMB service. 3 |
Mitigations
ID | Mitigation | Description |
---|---|---|
M0931 | Network Intrusion Prevention | Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. 2 |
Detection
ID | Data Source | Data Component |
---|---|---|
DS0017 | Command | Command Execution |
DS0022 | File | File Creation |
DS0033 | Network Share | Network Share Access |
DS0029 | Network Traffic | Network Traffic Content |
DS0009 | Process | Process Creation |
References
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Enterprise ATT&CK Enterprise ATT&CK Lateral Tool Transfer Retrieved. 2019/10/27 Lateral Tool Transfer Retrieved. 2019/10/27 ↩↩
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Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S 2014, February Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting Retrieved. 2016/04/20 ↩
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Joe Slowik 2019, April 10 Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments Retrieved. 2019/10/27 ↩↩↩
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Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved. 2017/09/22 ↩
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DHS/CISA. (2022, May 25). Alert (AA22-103A) APT Cyber Tools Targeting ICS/SCADA Devices. Retrieved September 28, 2022. ↩
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Jimmy Wylie. (2022, August). Analyzing PIPEDREAM: Challenges in Testing an ICS Attack Toolkit. Defcon 30. ↩
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Joe Slowik. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved December 18, 2020. ↩