Skip to content

T1598.003 Spearphishing Link

Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.

All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.25 The given website may be a clone of a legitimate site (such as an online or corporate login portal) or may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an “@” symbol: for example, hxxp://google.com@1157586937.8

Adversaries may also embed “tracking pixels,” “web bugs,” or “web beacons” within phishing messages to verify the receipt of an email, while also potentially profiling and tracking victim information such as IP address.911 These mechanisms often appear as small images (typically one pixel in size) or otherwise obfuscated objects and are typically delivered as HTML code containing a link to a remote server.113

Adversaries may also be able to spoof a complete website using what is known as a “browser-in-the-browser” (BitB) attack. By generating a fake browser popup window with an HTML-based address bar that appears to contain a legitimate URL (such as an authentication portal), they may be able to prompt users to enter their credentials while bypassing typical URL verification methods.137

Adversaries can use phishing kits such as EvilProxy and Evilginx2 to perform adversary-in-the-middle phishing by proxying the connection between the victim and the legitimate website. On a successful login, the victim is redirected to the legitimate website, while the adversary captures their session cookie (i.e., Steal Web Session Cookie) in addition to their username and password. This may enable the adversary to then bypass MFA via Web Session Cookie.10

Adversaries may also send a malicious link in the form of Quick Response (QR) Codes (also known as “quishing”). These links may direct a victim to a credential phishing page.4 By using a QR code, the URL may not be exposed in the email and may thus go undetected by most automated email security scans.12 These QR codes may be scanned by or delivered directly to a user’s mobile device (i.e., Phishing), which may be less secure in several relevant ways.12 For example, mobile users may not be able to notice minor differences between genuine and credential harvesting websites due to mobile’s smaller form factor.

From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the adversary. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Victim-Owned Websites) to craft persuasive and believable lures.

Item Value
ID T1598.003
Sub-techniques T1598.001, T1598.002, T1598.003, T1598.004
Tactics TA0043
Platforms PRE
Version 1.7
Created 02 October 2020
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0677 AADInternals AADInternals can send phishing emails containing malicious links designed to collect users’ credentials.14
G0007 APT28 APT28 has conducted credential phishing campaigns with links that redirect to credential harvesting sites.4041393842
G0050 APT32 APT32 has used malicious links to direct users to web pages designed to harvest credentials.27
G1012 CURIUM CURIUM used malicious links to adversary-controlled resources for credential harvesting.48
G0035 Dragonfly Dragonfly has used spearphishing with PDF attachments containing malicious links that redirected to credential harvesting websites.49
G0094 Kimsuky Kimsuky has used links in e-mail to steal account information including web beacons for target profiling.29283031
G0059 Magic Hound Magic Hound has used SMS and email messages with links designed to steal credentials or track victims.333436353237
G1036 Moonstone Sleet Moonstone Sleet used spearphishing messages containing items such as tracking pixels to determine if users interacted with malicious messages.47
G0129 Mustang Panda Mustang Panda has delivered web bugs to profile their intended targets.18
G0040 Patchwork Patchwork has used embedded image tags (known as web bugs) with unique, per-recipient tracking links in their emails for the purpose of identifying which recipients opened messages.50
G0034 Sandworm Team Sandworm Team has crafted spearphishing emails with hyperlinks designed to trick unwitting recipients into revealing their account credentials.19
G1015 Scattered Spider Scattered Spider has used domains mirroring corporate login portals to socially engineer victims into providing credentials.17
G0121 Sidewinder Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious links to credential harvesting websites.16
G0122 Silent Librarian Silent Librarian has used links in e-mails to direct victims to credential harvesting websites designed to appear like the targeted organization’s login page.202122232425
S0649 SMOKEDHAM SMOKEDHAM has been delivered via malicious links in phishing emails.15
G1033 Star Blizzard Star Blizzard has sent emails to establish rapport with targets eventually sending messages with links to credential-stealing sites.44434546
G0128 ZIRCONIUM ZIRCONIUM has used web beacons in e-mails to track hits to attacker-controlled URL’s.26

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1054 Software Configuration Use anti-spoofing and email authentication mechanisms to filter messages based on validity checks of the sender domain (using SPF) and integrity of messages (using DKIM). Enabling these mechanisms within an organization (through policies such as DMARC) may enable recipients (intra-org and cross domain) to perform similar message filtering and validation.61
M1017 User Training Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing attempts. Additionally, users may perform visual checks of the domains they visit; however, homographs in ASCII and in IDN domains and URL schema obfuscation may render manual checks difficult. Phishing training and other cybersecurity training may raise awareness to check URLs before visiting the sites.

References

  1. Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved November 17, 2024. ↩

  2. Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky ‘Forms’ of Phishing. Retrieved October 20, 2020. ↩

  3. IAPP. (n.d.). Retrieved March 5, 2024. ↩

  4. Jonathan Greig. (2023, August 16). Phishing campaign used QR codes to target large energy company. Retrieved November 27, 2023. ↩

  5. Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020. ↩

  6. Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020. ↩

  7. mr.d0x. (2022, March 15). Browser In The Browser (BITB) Attack. Retrieved March 8, 2023. ↩

  8. Nick Simonian. (2023, May 22). Don’t @ Me: URL Obfuscation Through Schema Abuse. Retrieved August 4, 2023. ↩

  9. NIST Information Technology Laboratory. (n.d.). web bug. Retrieved March 22, 2023. ↩

  10. Proofpoint. (n.d.). The Human Factor 2023: Analyzing the cyber attack chain. Retrieved July 20, 2023. ↩

  11. Ryte Wiki. (n.d.). Retrieved November 17, 2024. ↩↩

  12. Tim Bedard and Tyler Johnson. (2023, October 4). QR Code Scams & Phishing. Retrieved November 27, 2023. ↩↩

  13. ZScaler. (2020, February 11). Fake Sites Stealing Steam Credentials. Retrieved March 8, 2023. ↩

  14. Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2018, October 25). AADInternals. Retrieved February 18, 2022. ↩

  15. FireEye. (2021, May 11). Shining a Light on DARKSIDE Ransomware Operations. Retrieved September 22, 2021. ↩

  16. Hegel, T. (2021, January 13). A Global Perspective of the SideWinder APT. Retrieved January 27, 2021. ↩

  17. Check Point Team. (2025, July 7). Exposing Scattered Spider: New Indicators Highlight Growing Threat to Enterprises and Aviation. Retrieved October 13, 2025. ↩

  18. Raggi, M. et al. (2022, March 7). The Good, the Bad, and the Web Bug: TA416 Increases Operational Tempo Against European Governments as Conflict in Ukraine Escalates. Retrieved March 16, 2022. ↩

  19. Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020. ↩

  20. DOJ. (2018, March 23). U.S. v. Rafatnejad et al . Retrieved February 3, 2021. ↩

  21. Hassold, Crane. (2018, March 26). Silent Librarian: More to the Story of the Iranian Mabna Institute Indictment. Retrieved February 3, 2021. ↩

  22. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2018, August 24). Back to School: COBALT DICKENS Targets Universities. Retrieved February 3, 2021. ↩

  23. Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021. ↩

  24. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, September 11). COBALT DICKENS Goes Back to School…Again. Retrieved February 3, 2021. ↩

  25. Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021. ↩

  26. Burt, T. (2020, September 10). New cyberattacks targeting U.S. elections. Retrieved March 24, 2021. ↩

  27. Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020. ↩

  28. Jazi, H. (2021, June 1). Kimsuky APT continues to target South Korean government using AppleSeed backdoor. Retrieved June 10, 2021. ↩

  29. Kim, J. et al. (2019, October). KIMSUKY GROUP: TRACKING THE KING OF THE SPEAR PHISHING. Retrieved November 2, 2020. ↩

  30. KISA. (2021). Phishing Target Reconnaissance and Attack Resource Analysis Operation Muzabi. Retrieved March 8, 2024. ↩

  31. Lesnewich, G. et al. (2024, April 16). From Social Engineering to DMARC Abuse: TA427’s Art of Information Gathering. Retrieved May 3, 2024. ↩

  32. Bash, A. (2021, October 14). Countering threats from Iran. Retrieved January 4, 2023. ↩

  33. Certfa Labs. (2021, January 8). Charming Kitten’s Christmas Gift. Retrieved May 3, 2021. ↩

  34. ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town 3 - Charming Kitten Campaign Evolved and Deploying Spear-Phishing link by WhatsApp. Retrieved April 21, 2021. ↩

  35. Miller, J. et al. (2021, July 13). Operation SpoofedScholars: A Conversation with TA453. Retrieved August 18, 2021. ↩

  36. Miller, J. et al. (2021, March 30). BadBlood: TA453 Targets US and Israeli Medical Research Personnel in Credential Phishing Campaigns. Retrieved May 4, 2021. ↩

  37. Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. ↩

  38. ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019. ↩

  39. Huntley, S. (2022, March 7). An update on the threat landscape. Retrieved March 16, 2022. ↩

  40. Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved November 17, 2024. ↩

  41. Secureworks CTU. (2017, March 30). IRON TWILIGHT Supports Active Measures. Retrieved February 28, 2022. ↩

  42. CISA, et al. (2023, December 7). Russian FSB Cyber Actor Star Blizzard Continues Worldwide Spear-phishing Campaigns. Retrieved June 13, 2024. ↩

  43. Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2022, August 15). Disrupting SEABORGIUM’s ongoing phishing operations. Retrieved June 13, 2024. ↩

  44. Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, December 7). Star Blizzard increases sophistication and evasion in ongoing attacks. Retrieved February 13, 2024. ↩

  45. Shields, W. (2024, January 18). Russian threat group COLDRIVER expands its targeting of Western officials to include the use of malware. Retrieved June 13, 2024. ↩

  46. Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, May 28). Moonstone Sleet emerges as new North Korean threat actor with new bag of tricks. Retrieved August 26, 2024. ↩

  47. PwC Threat Intelligence. (2023, October 25). Yellow Liderc ships its scripts and delivers IMAPLoader malware. Retrieved August 14, 2024. ↩

  48. US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018. ↩

  49. Meltzer, M, et al. (2018, June 07). Patchwork APT Group Targets US Think Tanks. Retrieved July 16, 2018. ↩