T1588.003 Code Signing Certificates
Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.1 Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don’t know who issued the certificate or who the author is.
Prior to Code Signing, adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party.
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| ID | T1588.003 |
| Sub-techniques | T1588.001, T1588.002, T1588.003, T1588.004, T1588.005, T1588.006, T1588.007 |
| Tactics | TA0042 |
| Platforms | PRE |
| Version | 1.1 |
| Created | 01 October 2020 |
| Last Modified | 24 October 2025 |
Procedure Examples
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| C0040 | APT41 DUST | APT41 DUST used stolen code signing certificates to sign DUSTTRAP malware and components.12 |
| G0098 | BlackTech | BlackTech has used stolen code-signing certificates for its malicious payloads.6 |
| G0061 | FIN8 | FIN8 has used an expired open-source X.509 certificate for testing in the OpenSSL repository, to connect to actor-controlled C2 servers.7 |
| C0038 | HomeLand Justice | During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used tools with legitimate code signing certificates. 11 |
| G0094 | Kimsuky | Kimsuky has stolen a valid certificate that is used to sign the malware and the dropper.10 |
| S0576 | MegaCortex | MegaCortex has used code signing certificates issued to fake companies to bypass security controls.2 |
| G0129 | Mustang Panda | Mustang Panda has used revoked code signing certificates for its malicious payloads.8 |
| G0049 | OilRig | OilRig has obtained stolen code signing certificates to digitally sign malware.5 |
| C0022 | Operation Dream Job | During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used code signing certificates issued by Sectigo RSA for some of its malware and tools.13 |
| G0027 | Threat Group-3390 | Threat Group-3390 has obtained stolen valid certificates, including from VMProtect and the Chinese instant messaging application Youdu, for their operations.9 |
| G0102 | Wizard Spider | Wizard Spider has obtained code signing certificates signed by DigiCert, GlobalSign, and COMOOD for malware payloads.43 |
Mitigations
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1056 | Pre-compromise | This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. |
References
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Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016. ↩
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Del Fierro, C. Kessem, L.. (2020, January 8). From Mega to Giga: Cross-Version Comparison of Top MegaCortex Modifications. Retrieved February 15, 2021. ↩
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Shilko, J., et al. (2021, October 7). FIN12: The Prolific Ransomware Intrusion Threat Actor That Has Aggressively Pursued Healthcare Targets. Retrieved June 15, 2023. ↩
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The DFIR Report. (2020, November 5). Ryuk Speed Run, 2 Hours to Ransom. Retrieved November 6, 2020. ↩
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ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2017, January 5). Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford. Retrieved May 3, 2017. ↩
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Threat Intelligence. (2020, September 29). Palmerworm: Espionage Gang Targets the Media, Finance, and Other Sectors. Retrieved March 25, 2022. ↩
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Budaca, E., et al. (2021, August 25). FIN8 Threat Actor Goes Agile with New Sardonic Backdoor. Retrieved August 9, 2023. ↩
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Sudeep Singh. (2025, April 16). Latest Mustang Panda Arsenal: PAKLOG, CorKLOG, and SplatCloak | P2. Retrieved September 12, 2025. ↩
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Daniel Lunghi. (2023, March 1). Iron Tiger’s SysUpdate Reappears, Adds Linux Targeting. Retrieved March 20, 2023. ↩
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Jiho Kim & Sebin Lee, S2W. (2024, February 7). Kimsuky disguised as a Korean company signed with a valid certificate to distribute Troll Stealer (English ver.). Retrieved January 17, 2025. ↩
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CISA. (2022, September 23). AA22-264A Iranian State Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against the Government of Albania. Retrieved August 6, 2024. ↩
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Mike Stokkel et al. (2024, July 18). APT41 Has Arisen From the DUST. Retrieved September 16, 2024. ↩
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Breitenbacher, D and Osis, K. (2020, June 17). OPERATION IN(TER)CEPTION: Targeted Attacks Against European Aerospace and Military Companies. Retrieved December 20, 2021. ↩