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T1555 Credentials from Password Stores

Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications that store passwords to make it easier for users manage and maintain. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.

Item Value
ID T1555
Sub-techniques T1555.001, T1555.002, T1555.003, T1555.004, T1555.005
Tactics TA0006
Platforms Linux, Windows, macOS
Permissions required Administrator
Version 1.0
Created 11 February 2020
Last Modified 01 April 2022

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0331 Agent Tesla Agent Tesla has the ability to steal credentials from FTP clients and wireless profiles.21
G0064 APT33 APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials.3637
G0087 APT39 APT39 has used the Smartftp Password Decryptor tool to decrypt FTP passwords.23
S0373 Astaroth Astaroth uses an external software known as NetPass to recover passwords. 17
S0484 Carberp Carberp‘s passw.plug plugin can gather account information from multiple instant messaging, email, and social media services, as well as FTP, VNC, and VPN clients.16
S0050 CosmicDuke CosmicDuke collects user credentials, including passwords, for various programs including popular instant messaging applications and email clients as well as WLAN keys.20
G0120 Evilnum Evilnum can collect email credentials from victims.35
G0037 FIN6 FIN6 has used the Stealer One credential stealer to target e-mail and file transfer utilities including FTP.27
G1001 HEXANE HEXANE has run cmdkey on victim machines to identify stored credentials.33
S0526 KGH_SPY KGH_SPY can collect credentials from WINSCP.13
S0349 LaZagne LaZagne can obtain credentials from databases, mail, and WiFi across multiple platforms.7
G0077 Leafminer Leafminer used several tools for retrieving login and password information, including LaZagne.34
S0447 Lokibot Lokibot has stolen credentials from multiple applications and data sources including Windows OS credentials, email clients, FTP, and SFTP clients.15
S0167 Matryoshka Matryoshka is capable of stealing Outlook passwords.1112
S0002 Mimikatz Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the credential vault and DPAPI.12345
G0069 MuddyWater MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with LaZagne and other tools, including by dumping passwords saved in victim email.242526
S0198 NETWIRE NETWIRE can retrieve passwords from messaging and mail client applications.22
G0049 OilRig OilRig has used credential dumping tools such as LaZagne to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access.32303129
S0138 OLDBAIT OLDBAIT collects credentials from several email clients.14
S0048 PinchDuke PinchDuke steals credentials from compromised hosts. PinchDuke‘s credential stealing functionality is believed to be based on the source code of the Pinch credential stealing malware (also known as LdPinch). Credentials targeted by PinchDuke include ones associated with many sources such as The Bat!, Yahoo!, Mail.ru, Passport.Net, Google Talk, and Microsoft Outlook.20
S0435 PLEAD PLEAD has the ability to steal saved passwords from Microsoft Outlook.19
S0378 PoshC2 PoshC2 can decrypt passwords stored in the RDCMan configuration file.10
S0113 Prikormka A module in Prikormka collects passwords stored in applications installed on the victim.18
S0192 Pupy Pupy can use Lazagne for harvesting credentials.6
S0262 QuasarRAT QuasarRAT can obtain passwords from common FTP clients.89
C0024 SolarWinds Compromise During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used account credentials they obtained to attempt access to Group Managed Service Account (gMSA) passwords.38
G0038 Stealth Falcon Stealth Falcon malware gathers passwords from multiple sources, including Windows Credential Vault and Outlook.28

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1027 Password Policies The password for the user’s login keychain can be changed from the user’s login password. This increases the complexity for an adversary because they need to know an additional password.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0017 Command Command Execution
DS0022 File File Access
DS0009 Process OS API Execution

References

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  17. Salem, E. (2019, February 13). ASTAROTH MALWARE USES LEGITIMATE OS AND ANTIVIRUS PROCESSES TO STEAL PASSWORDS AND PERSONAL DATA. Retrieved April 17, 2019. ↩

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  19. Cherepanov, A.. (2018, July 9). Certificates stolen from Taiwanese tech‑companies misused in Plead malware campaign. Retrieved May 6, 2020. ↩

  20. F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015. ↩↩

  21. Jazi, H. (2020, April 16). New AgentTesla variant steals WiFi credentials. Retrieved May 19, 2020. ↩

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  23. Rusu, B. (2020, May 21). Iranian Chafer APT Targeted Air Transportation and Government in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Retrieved May 22, 2020. ↩

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  25. Symantec DeepSight Adversary Intelligence Team. (2018, December 10). Seedworm: Group Compromises Government Agencies, Oil & Gas, NGOs, Telecoms, and IT Firms. Retrieved December 14, 2018. ↩

  26. Peretz, A. and Theck, E. (2021, March 5). Earth Vetala – MuddyWater Continues to Target Organizations in the Middle East. Retrieved March 18, 2021. ↩

  27. Visa Public. (2019, February). FIN6 Cybercrime Group Expands Threat to eCommerce Merchants. Retrieved September 16, 2019. ↩

  28. Marczak, B. and Scott-Railton, J.. (2016, May 29). Keep Calm and (Don’t) Enable Macros: A New Threat Actor Targets UAE Dissidents. Retrieved June 8, 2016. ↩

  29. Bromiley, M., et al.. (2019, July 18). Hard Pass: Declining APT34’s Invite to Join Their Professional Network. Retrieved August 26, 2019. ↩

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  32. Unit42. (2016, May 1). Evasive Serpens Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved February 6, 2023. ↩

  33. Kayal, A. et al. (2021, October). LYCEUM REBORN: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Retrieved June 14, 2022. ↩

  34. Symantec Security Response. (2018, July 25). Leafminer: New Espionage Campaigns Targeting Middle Eastern Regions. Retrieved August 28, 2018. ↩

  35. Porolli, M. (2020, July 9). More evil: A deep look at Evilnum and its toolset. Retrieved January 22, 2021. ↩

  36. Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019. ↩

  37. Ackerman, G., et al. (2018, December 21). OVERRULED: Containing a Potentially Destructive Adversary. Retrieved January 17, 2019. ↩

  38. MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021. ↩