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T1012 Query Registry

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.

The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security.1 Information can easily be queried using the Reg utility, though other means to access the Registry exist. Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network. Adversaries may use the information from Query Registry during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Item Value
ID T1012
Sub-techniques
Tactics TA0007
Platforms Windows
Version 1.3
Created 31 May 2017
Last Modified 03 April 2023

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0045 ADVSTORESHELL ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys.1112
G0050 APT32 APT32‘s backdoor can query the Windows Registry to gather system information. 96
G0087 APT39 APT39 has used various strains of malware to query the Registry.108
S0438 Attor Attor has opened the registry and performed query searches.16
S0344 Azorult Azorult can check for installed software on the system under the Registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall.43
S0414 BabyShark BabyShark has executed the reg query command for HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default.33
S0031 BACKSPACE BACKSPACE is capable of enumerating and making modifications to an infected system’s Registry.61
S0239 Bankshot Bankshot searches for certain Registry keys to be configured before executing the payload.83
S0534 Bazar Bazar can query Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall for installed applications.3637
S0574 BendyBear BendyBear can query the host’s Registry key at HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Console\QuickEdit to retrieve data.81
S0268 Bisonal Bisonal has used the RegQueryValueExA function to retrieve proxy information in the Registry.25
S0570 BitPaymer BitPaymer can use the RegEnumKeyW to iterate through Registry keys.22
S0252 Brave Prince Brave Prince gathers information about the Registry.7
S1039 Bumblebee Bumblebee can check the Registry for specific keys.64
S0030 Carbanak Carbanak checks the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings for proxy configurations information.55
S0484 Carberp Carberp has searched the Image File Execution Options registry key for “Debugger” within every subkey.49
S0335 Carbon Carbon enumerates values in the Registry.85
S0348 Cardinal RAT Cardinal RAT contains watchdog functionality that periodically ensures HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load is set to point to its executable.59
S0674 CharmPower CharmPower has the ability to enumerate Uninstall registry values.82
G0114 Chimera Chimera has queried Registry keys using reg query \\HKU\\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers and reg query \\HKU\\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings.104
S0023 CHOPSTICK CHOPSTICK provides access to the Windows Registry, which can be used to gather information.15
S0660 Clambling Clambling has the ability to enumerate Registry keys, including KEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Bitcoin\Bitcoin-Qt\strDataDir to search for a bitcoin wallet.7574
S0154 Cobalt Strike Cobalt Strike can query HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\\Excel\Security\AccessVBOM\ to determine if the security setting for restricting default programmatic access is enabled.4647
S0126 ComRAT ComRAT can check the default browser by querying HKCR\http\shell\open\command.67
S0115 Crimson Crimson can check the Registry for the presence of HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\last_edate to determine how long it has been installed on a host.56
S0673 DarkWatchman DarkWatchman can query the Registry to determine if it has already been installed on the system.51
S0354 Denis Denis queries the Registry for keys and values.9
S0021 Derusbi Derusbi is capable of enumerating Registry keys and values.89
S0186 DownPaper DownPaper searches and reads the value of the Windows Update Registry Run key.13
G0035 Dragonfly Dragonfly has queried the Registry to identify victim information.98
S0567 Dtrack Dtrack can collect the RegisteredOwner, RegisteredOrganization, and InstallDate registry values.93
S0091 Epic Epic uses the rem reg query command to obtain values from Registry keys.66
S0512 FatDuke FatDuke can get user agent strings for the default browser from HKCU\Software\Classes\http\shell\open\command.42
S0267 FELIXROOT FELIXROOT queries the Registry for specific keys for potential privilege escalation and proxy information. FELIXROOT has also used WMI to query the Windows Registry.3435
S0182 FinFisher FinFisher queries Registry values as part of its anti-sandbox checks.7980
G0117 Fox Kitten Fox Kitten has accessed Registry hives ntuser.dat and UserClass.dat.95
S1044 FunnyDream FunnyDream can check Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings to extract the ProxyServer string.2
S0666 Gelsemium Gelsemium can open random files and Registry keys to obscure malware behavior from sandbox analysis.40
S0032 gh0st RAT gh0st RAT has checked for the existence of a Service key to determine if it has already been installed on the system.62
S0249 Gold Dragon Gold Dragon enumerates registry keys with the command regkeyenum and obtains information for the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.7
S0376 HOPLIGHT A variant of HOPLIGHT hooks lsass.exe, and lsass.exe then checks the Registry for the data value ‘rdpproto’ under the key SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa Name.69
S0203 Hydraq Hydraq creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can retrieve system information, such as CPU speed, from Registry keys.8788
S0604 Industroyer Industroyer has a data wiper component that enumerates keys in the Registry HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services.86
S0260 InvisiMole InvisiMole can enumerate Registry values, keys, and data.26
S0201 JPIN JPIN can enumerate Registry keys.14
G0094 Kimsuky Kimsuky has obtained specific Registry keys and values on a compromised host.97
G0032 Lazarus Group Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia checks Registry keys within HKCU and HKLM to determine if certain applications are present, including SecureCRT, Terminal Services, RealVNC, TightVNC, UltraVNC, Radmin, mRemote, TeamViewer, FileZilla, pcAnyware, and Remote Desktop. Another Lazarus Group malware sample checks for the presence of the following Registry key:HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Bitcoin\Bitcoin-Qt.106105107
S0513 LiteDuke LiteDuke can query the Registry to check for the presence of HKCU\Software\KasperskyLab.42
S0680 LitePower LitePower can query the Registry for keys added to execute COM hijacking.70
S0532 Lucifer Lucifer can check for existing stratum cryptomining information in HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\spreadCpuXmr – %stratum info%.68
S1060 Mafalda Mafalda can enumerate Registry keys with all subkeys and values.65
S1015 Milan Milan can query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid to retrieve the machine GUID.44
S1047 Mori Mori can read data from the Registry including from HKLM\Software\NFC\IPA and
HKLM\Software\NFC\.24
S0385 njRAT njRAT can read specific registry values.94
G0049 OilRig OilRig has used reg query “HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default” on a victim to query the Registry.103
C0014 Operation Wocao During Operation Wocao, the threat actors executed /c cd /d c:\windows\temp\ & reg query HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\<username>\PuTTY\Sessions\ to detect recent PuTTY sessions, likely to further lateral movement.109
S0165 OSInfo OSInfo queries the registry to look for information about Terminal Services.60
S1050 PcShare PcShare can search the registry files of a compromised host.2
S0517 Pillowmint Pillowmint has used shellcode which reads code stored in the registry keys \REGISTRY\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\DRM using the native Windows API as well as read HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Interfaces as part of its C2.17
S0013 PlugX PlugX can enumerate and query for information contained within the Windows Registry.3031
S0145 POWERSOURCE POWERSOURCE queries Registry keys in preparation for setting Run keys to achieve persistence.91
S0194 PowerSploit PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can query Registry keys for potential opportunities.34
S0184 POWRUNER POWRUNER may query the Registry by running reg query on a victim.53
S0238 Proxysvc Proxysvc gathers product names from the Registry key: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion ProductName and the processor description from the Registry key HKLM\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 ProcessorNameString.76
S0269 QUADAGENT QUADAGENT checks if a value exists within a Registry key in the HKCU hive whose name is the same as the scheduled task it has created.41
S0241 RATANKBA RATANKBA uses the command reg query “HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\InternetSettings”.71
S0172 Reaver Reaver queries the Registry to determine the correct Startup path to use for persistence.84
S0075 Reg Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface.6
S0496 REvil REvil can query the Registry to get random file extensions to append to encrypted files.48
S0448 Rising Sun Rising Sun has identified the OS product name from a compromised host by searching the registry for SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\Windows NT\ CurrentVersion | ProductName.8
S0240 ROKRAT ROKRAT can access the HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\mssmbios\Data\SMBiosData Registry key to obtain the System manufacturer value to identify the machine type.78
S1018 Saint Bot Saint Bot has used check_registry_keys as part of its environmental checks.38
S0140 Shamoon Shamoon queries several Registry keys to identify hard disk partitions to overwrite.52
S1019 Shark Shark can query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid to retrieve the machine GUID.44
S0589 Sibot Sibot has queried the registry for proxy server information.54
S0692 SILENTTRINITY SILENTTRINITY can use the GetRegValue function to check Registry keys within HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer\AlwaysInstallElevated and HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer\AlwaysInstallElevated. It also contains additional modules that can check software AutoRun values and use the Win32 namespace to get values from HKCU, HKLM, HKCR, and HKCC hives.5
S0627 SodaMaster SodaMaster has the ability to query the Registry to detect a key specific to VMware.21
G0038 Stealth Falcon Stealth Falcon malware attempts to determine the installed version of .NET by querying the Registry.101
S0380 StoneDrill StoneDrill has looked in the registry to find the default browser path.73
S0603 Stuxnet Stuxnet searches the Registry for indicators of security programs.77
S0559 SUNBURST SUNBURST collected the registry value HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid from compromised hosts.39
S1064 SVCReady SVCReady can search for the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System Registry key to gather system information.58
S0242 SynAck SynAck enumerates Registry keys associated with event logs.45
S0011 Taidoor Taidoor can query the Registry on compromised hosts using RegQueryValueExA.90
S0560 TEARDROP TEARDROP checked that HKU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF existed before decoding its embedded payload.3992
G0027 Threat Group-3390 A Threat Group-3390 tool can read and decrypt stored Registry values.99
S0668 TinyTurla TinyTurla can query the Registry for its configuration information.32
G0010 Turla Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover information in the Windows Registry with the reg query command.66 Turla has also retrieved PowerShell payloads hidden in Registry keys as well as checking keys associated with null session named pipes .102
S0386 Ursnif Ursnif has used Reg to query the Registry for installed programs.1920
S0476 Valak Valak can use the Registry for code updates and to collect credentials.28
S0180 Volgmer Volgmer checks the system for certain Registry keys.29
S0612 WastedLocker WastedLocker checks for specific registry keys related to the UCOMIEnumConnections and IActiveScriptParseProcedure32 interfaces.50
S0579 Waterbear Waterbear can query the Registry key “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSDTC\MTxOCI” to see if the value OracleOcilib exists.72
S0155 WINDSHIELD WINDSHIELD can gather Registry values.23
S1065 Woody RAT Woody RAT can search registry keys to identify antivirus programs on an compromised host.27
S0251 Zebrocy Zebrocy executes the reg query command to obtain information in the Registry.10
S0330 Zeus Panda Zeus Panda checks for the existence of a Registry key and if it contains certain values.57
G0128 ZIRCONIUM ZIRCONIUM has used a tool to query the Registry for proxy settings.100
S0412 ZxShell ZxShell can query the netsvc group value data located in the svchost group Registry key.63
S1013 ZxxZ ZxxZ can search the registry of a compromised host.18

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0017 Command Command Execution
DS0009 Process OS API Execution
DS0024 Windows Registry Windows Registry Key Access

References

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