T1608.006 SEO Poisoning
Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.21
To help facilitate Drive-by Compromise, adversaries may stage content that explicitly manipulates SEO rankings in order to promote sites hosting their malicious payloads (such as Drive-by Target) within search engines. Poisoning SEO rankings may involve various tricks, such as stuffing keywords (including in the form of hidden text) into compromised sites. These keywords could be related to the interests/browsing habits of the intended victim(s) as well as more broad, seasonably popular topics (e.g. elections, trending news).52
In addition to internet search engines (such as Google), adversaries may also aim to manipulate specific in-site searches for developer platforms (such as GitHub) to deceive users towards Supply Chain Compromise lures. In-site searches will rank search results according to their own algorithms and metrics such as popularity6 which may be targeted and gamed by malicious actors.7
Adversaries may also purchase or plant incoming links to staged capabilities in order to boost the site’s calculated relevance and reputation.14
SEO poisoning may also be combined with evasive redirects and other cloaking mechanisms (such as measuring mouse movements or serving content based on browser user agents, user language/localization settings, or HTTP headers) in order to feed SEO inputs while avoiding scrutiny from defenders.53
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| ID | T1608.006 |
| Sub-techniques | T1608.001, T1608.002, T1608.003, T1608.004, T1608.005, T1608.006 |
| Tactics | TA0042 |
| Platforms | PRE |
| Version | 1.1 |
| Created | 30 September 2022 |
| Last Modified | 15 April 2025 |
Procedure Examples
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G1020 | Mustard Tempest | Mustard Tempest has poisoned search engine results to return fake software updates in order to distribute malware.98 |
Mitigations
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1056 | Pre-compromise | This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. |
References
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Arntz, P. (2018, May 29). SEO poisoning: Is it worth it?. Retrieved September 30, 2022. ↩↩
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Atlas Cybersecurity. (2021, April 19). Threat Actors use Search-Engine-Optimization Tactics to Redirect Traffic and Install Malware. Retrieved September 30, 2022. ↩↩
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Szappanos, G. & Brandt, A. (2021, March 1). “Gootloader” expands its payload delivery options. Retrieved September 30, 2022. ↩
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The DFIR Report. (2022, May 9). SEO Poisoning – A Gootloader Story. Retrieved September 30, 2022. ↩
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Wang, J. (2018, October 17). Ubiquitous SEO Poisoning URLs. Retrieved September 30, 2022. ↩↩
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Yehuda Gelb. (2023, November 30). The GitHub Black Market: Gaming the Star Ranking Game. Retrieved June 18, 2024. ↩
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Yehuda Gelb. (2024, April 10). New Technique to Trick Developers Detected in an Open Source Supply Chain Attack. Retrieved June 18, 2024. ↩
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Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024. ↩
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Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023. ↩