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T1189 Drive-by Compromise

Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user’s web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring Application Access Token.

Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:

  • A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting
  • Script files served to a legitimate website from a publicly writeable cloud storage bucket are modified by an adversary
  • Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers (i.e., Malvertising)
  • Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).

Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.1

Typical drive-by compromise process:

  1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.
  2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version.
    • The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.
  3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.
  4. If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user’s system unless other protections are in place.
    • In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.

Unlike Exploit Public-Facing Application, the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.

Adversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed to Steal Application Access Tokens, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information. These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.2

Item Value
ID T1189
Sub-techniques
Tactics TA0001
Platforms Linux, SaaS, Windows, macOS
Version 1.5
Created 18 April 2018
Last Modified 14 April 2023

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0138 Andariel Andariel has used watering hole attacks, often with zero-day exploits, to gain initial access to victims within a specific IP range.3536
G0073 APT19 APT19 performed a watering hole attack on forbes.com in 2014 to compromise targets.51
G0007 APT28 APT28 has compromised targets via strategic web compromise utilizing custom exploit kits.45
G0050 APT32 APT32 has infected victims by tricking them into visiting compromised watering hole websites.4647
G0067 APT37 APT37 has used strategic web compromises, particularly of South Korean websites, to distribute malware. The group has also used torrent file-sharing sites to more indiscriminately disseminate malware to victims. As part of their compromises, the group has used a Javascript based profiler called RICECURRY to profile a victim’s web browser and deliver malicious code accordingly.271728
G0082 APT38 APT38 has conducted watering holes schemes to gain initial access to victims.2122
G0001 Axiom Axiom has used watering hole attacks to gain access.54
S0606 Bad Rabbit Bad Rabbit spread through watering holes on popular sites by injecting JavaScript into the HTML body or a .js file.910
G0060 BRONZE BUTLER BRONZE BUTLER compromised three Japanese websites using a Flash exploit to perform watering hole attacks.33
S0482 Bundlore Bundlore has been spread through malicious advertisements on websites.8
C0010 C0010 During C0010, UNC3890 actors likely established a watering hole that was hosted on a login page of a legitimate Israeli shipping company that was active until at least November 2021.60
G0070 Dark Caracal Dark Caracal leveraged a watering hole to serve up malicious code.32
G0012 Darkhotel Darkhotel used embedded iframes on hotel login portals to redirect selected victims to download malware.20
G0035 Dragonfly Dragonfly has compromised targets via strategic web compromise (SWC) utilizing a custom exploit kit.575859
G1006 Earth Lusca Earth Lusca has performed watering hole attacks.23
G0066 Elderwood Elderwood has delivered zero-day exploits and malware to victims by injecting malicious code into specific public Web pages visited by targets within a particular sector.242526
S0531 Grandoreiro Grandoreiro has used compromised websites and Google Ads to bait victims into downloading its installer.1112
S0215 KARAE KARAE was distributed through torrent file-sharing websites to South Korean victims, using a YouTube video downloader application as a lure.17
G0032 Lazarus Group Lazarus Group delivered RATANKBA and other malicious code to victims via a compromised legitimate website.4344
G0077 Leafminer Leafminer has infected victims using watering holes.18
G0065 Leviathan Leviathan has infected victims using watering holes.42
S0451 LoudMiner LoudMiner is typically bundled with pirated copies of Virtual Studio Technology (VST) for Windows and macOS.7
G0095 Machete Machete has distributed Machete through a fake blog website.34
G0059 Magic Hound Magic Hound has conducted watering-hole attacks through media and magazine websites.50
C0016 Operation Dust Storm During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used a watering hole attack on a popular software reseller to exploit the then-zero-day Internet Explorer vulnerability CVE-2014-0322.61
G0040 Patchwork Patchwork has used watering holes to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.3940
G0068 PLATINUM PLATINUM has sometimes used drive-by attacks against vulnerable browser plugins.55
S0216 POORAIM POORAIM has been delivered through compromised sites acting as watering holes.17
G0056 PROMETHIUM PROMETHIUM has used watering hole attacks to deliver malicious versions of legitimate installers.19
S0496 REvil REvil has infected victim machines through compromised websites and exploit kits.13141516
G0048 RTM RTM has distributed its malware via the RIG and SUNDOWN exploit kits, as well as online advertising network Yandex.Direct.3738
G0027 Threat Group-3390 Threat Group-3390 has extensively used strategic web compromises to target victims.4849
G0134 Transparent Tribe Transparent Tribe has used websites with malicious hyperlinks and iframes to infect targeted victims with Crimson, njRAT, and other malicious tools.293031
G0010 Turla Turla has infected victims using watering holes.5253
G0124 Windigo Windigo has distributed Windows malware via drive-by downloads.56
G0112 Windshift Windshift has used compromised websites to register custom URL schemes on a remote system.41

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist.34
M1050 Exploit Protection Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. 5 Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. 6 Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.
M1021 Restrict Web-Based Content For malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing in the first place.
M1051 Update Software Ensure all browsers and plugins kept updated can help prevent the exploit phase of this technique. Use modern browsers with security features turned on.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0015 Application Log Application Log Content
DS0022 File File Creation
DS0029 Network Traffic Network Connection Creation
DS0009 Process Process Creation

References

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