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T1585.001 Social Media Accounts

Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations.12

For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of a persona on social media may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single social media site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Establishing a persona on social media may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.

Once a persona has been developed an adversary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.12 These accounts may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Spearphishing via Service).

Item Value
ID T1585.001
Sub-techniques T1585.001, T1585.002, T1585.003
Tactics TA0042
Platforms PRE
Version 1.1
Created 01 October 2020
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0050 APT32 APT32 has set up Facebook pages in tandem with fake websites.15
G0003 Cleaver Cleaver has created fake LinkedIn profiles that included profile photos, details, and connections.13
G1052 Contagious Interview Contagious Interview has created fake social media accounts such as LinkedIn and Telegram accounts for their targeting efforts.161718202119
G1012 CURIUM CURIUM has established a network of fictitious social media accounts, including on Facebook and LinkedIn, to establish relationships with victims, often posing as an attractive woman.12
G1011 EXOTIC LILY EXOTIC LILY has established social media profiles to mimic employees of targeted companies.7
G0117 Fox Kitten Fox Kitten has used a Twitter account to communicate with ransomware victims.22
G1001 HEXANE HEXANE has established fraudulent LinkedIn accounts impersonating HR department employees to target potential victims with fake job offers.8
G0094 Kimsuky Kimsuky has created social media accounts to monitor news and security trends as well as potential targets.10
G0032 Lazarus Group Lazarus Group has created new Twitter accounts to conduct social engineering against potential victims.14
G0065 Leviathan Leviathan has created new social media accounts for targeting efforts.11
G0059 Magic Hound Magic Hound has created fake LinkedIn and other social media accounts to contact targets and convince them–through messages and voice communications–to open malicious links.23
G1051 Medusa Group Medusa Group has created social media accounts including Telegram and X to publicize their activities.56
G1036 Moonstone Sleet Moonstone Sleet has created social media accounts to interact with victims.26
C0022 Operation Dream Job For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created fake LinkedIn accounts for their targeting efforts.2827
C0023 Operation Ghost For Operation Ghost, APT29 registered Twitter accounts to host C2 nodes.29
G0034 Sandworm Team Sandworm Team has established social media accounts to disseminate victim internal-only documents and other sensitive data.3
G1015 Scattered Spider Scattered Spider has created matching fake social media profiles to support new accounts created in victim environments.4
G1033 Star Blizzard Star Blizzard has established fraudulent profiles on professional networking sites to conduct reconnaissance.2524
G1050 Water Galura Water Galura operates a news channel on Telegram to make announcements for the Qilin RaaS.9

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1056 Pre-compromise This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.

References

  1. Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017. ↩↩

  2. Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017. ↩↩

  3. Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020. ↩

  4. CISA. (2023, November 16). Cybersecurity Advisory: Scattered Spider (AA23-320A). Retrieved March 18, 2024. ↩

  5. Anthony Galiette, Doel Santos. (2024, January 11). Medusa Ransomware Turning Your Files into Stone. Retrieved October 15, 2025. ↩

  6. Check Point. (2025, April 16). The 2025 Ransomware Surge: Context for Medusa’s Rise. Retrieved October 15, 2025. ↩

  7. Stolyarov, V. (2022, March 17). Exposing initial access broker with ties to Conti. Retrieved August 18, 2022. ↩

  8. ClearSky Cyber Security . (2021, August). New Iranian Espionage Campaign By “Siamesekitten” - Lyceum. Retrieved June 6, 2022. ↩

  9. Thomas, W. (2024, June 12). Tracking Adversaries: The Qilin RaaS. Retrieved September 26, 2025. ↩

  10. KISA. (2021). Phishing Target Reconnaissance and Attack Resource Analysis Operation Muzabi. Retrieved March 8, 2024. ↩

  11. CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department. Retrieved August 12, 2021. ↩

  12. Dell SecureWorks. (2015, October 7). Suspected Iran-Based Hacker Group Creates Network of Fake LinkedIn Profiles. Retrieved January 14, 2016. ↩

  13. Weidemann, A. (2021, January 25). New campaign targeting security researchers. Retrieved December 20, 2021. ↩

  14. Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020. ↩

  15. Insikt Group. (2025, February 13). Inside the Scam: North Korea’s IT Worker Threat. Retrieved October 17, 2025. ↩

  16. Matej Havranek. (2025, February 20). DeceptiveDevelopment targets freelance developers. Retrieved October 17, 2025. ↩

  17. Ryan Sherstobitoff. (2024, October 29). Inside a North Korean Phishing Operation Targeting DevOps Employees. Retrieved October 20, 2025. ↩

  18. Seongsu Park. (2024, November 4). From Pyongyang to Your Payroll: The Rise of North Korean Remote Workers in the West. Retrieved October 17, 2025. ↩

  19. Steve Cobb. (2024, October 29). The Job Offer That Wasn’t: How We Stopped an Espionage Plot. Retrieved October 20, 2025. ↩

  20. Unit42. (2024, October 9). Contagious Interview: DPRK Threat Actors Lure Tech Industry Job Seekers to Install New Variants of BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret Malware. Retrieved October 17, 2025. ↩

  21. ClearSky. (2020, December 17). Pay2Key Ransomware – A New Campaign by Fox Kitten. Retrieved December 21, 2020. ↩

  22. ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town 3 - Charming Kitten Campaign Evolved and Deploying Spear-Phishing link by WhatsApp. Retrieved April 21, 2021. ↩

  23. CISA, et al. (2023, December 7). Russian FSB Cyber Actor Star Blizzard Continues Worldwide Spear-phishing Campaigns. Retrieved June 13, 2024. ↩

  24. Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2022, August 15). Disrupting SEABORGIUM’s ongoing phishing operations. Retrieved June 13, 2024. ↩

  25. Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, May 28). Moonstone Sleet emerges as new North Korean threat actor with new bag of tricks. Retrieved August 26, 2024. ↩

  26. Breitenbacher, D and Osis, K. (2020, June 17). OPERATION IN(TER)CEPTION: Targeted Attacks Against European Aerospace and Military Companies. Retrieved December 20, 2021. ↩

  27. ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 13). Operation ‘Dream Job’ Widespread North Korean Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021. ↩

  28. Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020. ↩