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T1583.006 Web Services

Adversaries may register for web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control (Web Service), Exfiltration Over Web Service, or Phishing. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, GitHub, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise.21 By utilizing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them.

Item Value
ID T1583.006
Sub-techniques T1583.001, T1583.002, T1583.003, T1583.004, T1583.005, T1583.006, T1583.007, T1583.008
Tactics TA0042
Platforms PRE
Version 1.3
Created 01 October 2020
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0025 APT17 APT17 has created profile pages in Microsoft TechNet that were used as C2 infrastructure.17
G0007 APT28 APT28 has used newly-created Blogspot pages for credential harvesting operations.21
G0016 APT29 APT29 has registered algorithmically generated Twitter handles that are used for C2 by malware, such as HAMMERTOSS. APT29 has also used legitimate web services such as Dropbox and Constant Contact in their operations.222
G0050 APT32 APT32 has set up Dropbox, Amazon S3, and Google Drive to host malicious downloads.31
C0046 ArcaneDoor ArcaneDoor included the use of OpenConnect VPN Server instances for conducting actions on victim devices.38
G0142 Confucius Confucius has obtained cloud storage service accounts to host stolen data.25
G1052 Contagious Interview Contagious Interview has used web services such as Dropbox to receive stolen data and Google Drive, Firebase, GitHub, and Telegram to disseminate files.78 Contagious Interview has also used a cloud platform such as Vercel for C2 operations leveraging malicious web applications and static pages.91011 Contagious Interview has also used Slack to coordinate their activities.6
G1006 Earth Lusca Earth Lusca has established GitHub accounts to host their malware.4
G0046 FIN7 FIN7 has set up Amazon S3 buckets to host trojanized digital products.23
G0047 Gamaredon Group Gamaredon Group has used Cloudflare’s TryClouldflare service to obtain C2 nodes.26
G0125 HAFNIUM HAFNIUM has acquired web services for use in C2 and exfiltration.5
G0136 IndigoZebra IndigoZebra created Dropbox accounts for their operations.2728
G0094 Kimsuky Kimsuky has hosted content used for targeting efforts via web services such as Blogspot.32 Kimsuky has also leveraged Dropbox for hosting payloads and uploading victim system information. 33
G0032 Lazarus Group Lazarus Group has hosted malicious downloads on Github.24
G0140 LazyScripter LazyScripter has established GitHub accounts to host its toolsets.37
G0059 Magic Hound Magic Hound has acquired Amazon S3 buckets to use in C2.36
G1051 Medusa Group Medusa Group has utilized a file hosting service named filemail[.]com to host a zip file that contained malicious payloads that facilitated follow-on actions.12
G0069 MuddyWater MuddyWater has used file sharing services including OneHub, Sync, and TeraBox to distribute tools.182019
G0129 Mustang Panda Mustang Panda has set up Dropbox and Google Drive to host malicious downloads.13
C0022 Operation Dream Job During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used file hosting services like DropBox and OneDrive.40
C0013 Operation Sharpshooter For Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors used Dropbox to host lure documents and their first-stage downloader.39
G1005 POLONIUM POLONIUM has created and used legitimate Microsoft OneDrive accounts for their operations.30
G1031 Saint Bear Saint Bear has leveraged the Discord content delivery network to host malicious content for retrieval during initial access operations.29
G1018 TA2541 TA2541 has hosted malicious files on various platforms including Google Drive, OneDrive, Discord, PasteText, ShareText, and GitHub.35
G1038 TA578 TA578 has used Google Firebase to host malicious scripts.34
G0010 Turla Turla has created web accounts including Dropbox and GitHub for C2 and document exfiltration.14
G0128 ZIRCONIUM ZIRCONIUM has used GitHub to host malware linked in spearphishing e-mails.1516

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1056 Pre-compromise This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.

References

  1. Dvir Sasson. (2024, May 13). GitHub Abuse Flaw Shows Why We Can’t Shrug Off Abuse Vulnerabilities in Security. Retrieved March 31, 2025. ↩

  2. FireEye Labs. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved November 17, 2024. ↩↩

  3. ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021. ↩

  4. Chen, J., et al. (2022). Delving Deep: An Analysis of Earth Lusca’s Operations. Retrieved July 1, 2022. ↩

  5. MSTIC. (2021, March 2). HAFNIUM targeting Exchange Servers with 0-day exploits. Retrieved March 3, 2021. ↩

  6. Aleksandar Milenkoski, Sreekar Madabushi, Kenneth Kinion. (2025, September 4). Contagious Interview | North Korean Threat Actors Reveal Plans and Ops by Abusing Cyber Intel Platforms. Retrieved October 20, 2025. ↩

  7. Amaury G., Coline Chavane, Felix Aimé and Sekoia TDR. (2025, March 31). From Contagious to ClickFake Interview: Lazarus leveraging the ClickFix tactic. Retrieved April 1, 2025. ↩

  8. Insikt Group. (2025, February 13). Inside the Scam: North Korea’s IT Worker Threat. Retrieved October 17, 2025. ↩

  9. Kirill Boychenko. (2025, April 4). Lazarus Expands Malicious npm Campaign: 11 New Packages Add Malware Loaders and Bitbucket Payloads. Retrieved October 20, 2025. ↩

  10. Kirill Boychenko. (2025, July 14). Contagious Interview Campaign Escalates With 67 Malicious npm Packages and New Malware Loader. Retrieved October 19, 2025. ↩

  11. Kirill Boychenko. (2025, June 25). Another Wave: North Korean Contagious Interview Campaign Drops 35 New Malicious npm Packages. Retrieved October 19, 2025. ↩

  12. Anthony Galiette, Doel Santos. (2024, January 11). Medusa Ransomware Turning Your Files into Stone. Retrieved October 15, 2025. ↩

  13. Nick Dai, Vickie Su, Sunny Lu. (2022, November 18). Earth Preta Spear-Phishing Governments Worldwide. Retrieved August 4, 2025. ↩

  14. Faou, M. (2020, December 2). Turla Crutch: Keeping the “back door” open. Retrieved December 4, 2020. ↩

  15. Huntley, S. (2020, October 16). How We’re Tackling Evolving Online Threats. Retrieved March 24, 2021. ↩

  16. Singh, S. and Antil, S. (2020, October 27). APT-31 Leverages COVID-19 Vaccine Theme and Abuses Legitimate Online Services. Retrieved March 24, 2021. ↩

  17. FireEye Labs/FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2015, May 14). Hiding in Plain Sight: FireEye and Microsoft Expose Obfuscation Tactic. Retrieved November 17, 2024. ↩

  18. Mele, G. et al. (2021, February 10). Probable Iranian Cyber Actors, Static Kitten, Conducting Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting UAE and Kuwait Government Agencies. Retrieved March 17, 2021. ↩

  19. Miller, J. et al. (2024, March 21). Security Brief: TA450 Uses Embedded Links in PDF Attachments in Latest Campaign. Retrieved March 27, 2024. ↩

  20. Peretz, A. and Theck, E. (2021, March 5). Earth Vetala – MuddyWater Continues to Target Organizations in the Middle East. Retrieved March 18, 2021. ↩

  21. Huntley, S. (2022, March 7). An update on the threat landscape. Retrieved March 16, 2022. ↩

  22. Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021. ↩

  23. Abdo, B., et al. (2022, April 4). FIN7 Power Hour: Adversary Archaeology and the Evolution of FIN7. Retrieved April 5, 2022. ↩

  24. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2021, February 21). AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea’s Cryptocurrency Malware. Retrieved March 1, 2021. ↩

  25. Lunghi, D and Horejsi, J. (2018, February 13). Deciphering Confucius: A Look at the Group’s Cyberespionage Operations. Retrieved December 26, 2021. ↩

  26. Threat Hunter Team, Symantec and Carbon Black. (2025, April 10). Shuckworm Targets Foreign Military Mission Based in Ukraine. Retrieved July 23, 2025. ↩

  27. Lakshmanan, R.. (2021, July 1). IndigoZebra APT Hacking Campaign Targets the Afghan Government. Retrieved September 24, 2021. ↩

  28. CheckPoint Research. (2021, July 1). IndigoZebra APT continues to attack Central Asia with evolving tools. Retrieved September 24, 2021. ↩

  29. Unit 42. (2022, February 25). Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot. Retrieved June 9, 2022. ↩

  30. Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022. ↩

  31. Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020. ↩

  32. An, J and Malhotra, A. (2021, November 10). North Korean attackers use malicious blogs to deliver malware to high-profile South Korean targets. Retrieved December 29, 2021. ↩

  33. Den Iuzvyk, Tim Peck. (2025, February 13). Analyzing DEEP#DRIVE: North Korean Threat Actors Observed Exploiting Trusted Platforms for Targeted Attacks. Retrieved August 19, 2025. ↩

  34. Proofpoint Threat Research and Team Cymru S2 Threat Research. (2024, April 4). Latrodectus: This Spider Bytes Like Ice . Retrieved May 31, 2024. ↩

  35. Larson, S. and Wise, J. (2022, February 15). Charting TA2541’s Flight. Retrieved September 12, 2023. ↩

  36. Check Point. (2022, January 11). APT35 exploits Log4j vulnerability to distribute new modular PowerShell toolkit. Retrieved January 24, 2022. ↩

  37. Jazi, H. (2021, February). LazyScripter: From Empire to double RAT. Retrieved November 17, 2024. ↩

  38. Cisco Talos. (2024, April 24). ArcaneDoor - New espionage-focused campaign found targeting perimeter network devices. Retrieved January 6, 2025. ↩

  39. Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A., et. al.. (2018, December 18). Operation Sharpshooter Campaign Targets Global Defense, Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 14, 2020. ↩

  40. ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 13). Operation ‘Dream Job’ Widespread North Korean Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021. ↩