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T1574.007 Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories (User and System) that the OS searches sequentially through in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line.

Adversaries can place a malicious program in an earlier entry in the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, resulting in the operating system executing the malicious binary rather than the legitimate binary when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing.

For example, on Windows if an adversary places a malicious program named “net.exe” in C:\example path, which by default precedes C:\Windows\system32\net.exe in the PATH environment variable, when “net” is executed from the command-line the C:\example path will be called instead of the system’s legitimate executable at C:\Windows\system32\net.exe. Some methods of executing a program rely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched when the path for the program is not given, such as executing programs from a Command and Scripting Interpreter.2

Adversaries may also directly modify the $PATH variable specifying the directories to be searched. An adversary can modify the $PATH variable to point to a directory they have write access. When a program using the $PATH variable is called, the OS searches the specified directory and executes the malicious binary. On macOS, this can also be performed through modifying the $HOME variable. These variables can be modified using the command-line, launchctl, Unix Shell Configuration Modification, or modifying the /etc/paths.d folder contents.341

Item Value
ID T1574.007
Sub-techniques T1574.001, T1574.004, T1574.005, T1574.006, T1574.007, T1574.008, T1574.009, T1574.010, T1574.011, T1574.012, T1574.013, T1574.014
Tactics TA0003, TA0004, TA0005
Platforms Linux, Windows, macOS
Version 1.2
Created 13 March 2020
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S1111 DarkGate DarkGate overrides the %windir% environment variable by setting a Registry key, HKEY_CURRENT_User\Environment\windir, to an alternate command to execute a malicious AutoIt script. This allows DarkGate to run every time the scheduled task DiskCleanup is executed as this uses the path value %windir%\system32\cleanmgr.exe for execution.17
S0363 Empire Empire contains modules that can discover and exploit path interception opportunities in the PATH environment variable.16
S0194 PowerSploit PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit path interception opportunities in the PATH environment variable.1415

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1047 Audit Find and eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them. Be aware of the search order Windows uses for executing or loading binaries and use fully qualified paths wherever appropriate.
M1038 Execution Prevention Adversaries will likely need to place new binaries in locations to be executed through this weakness. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed path interception by using application control tools, like Windows Defender Application Control, AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.5678910
M1022 Restrict File and Directory Permissions Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\Windows\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution. Require that all executables be placed in write-protected directories.

References

  1. Elastic Security 7.17. (2022, February 1). Modification of Environment Variable via Launchctl. Retrieved September 28, 2023. ↩

  2. ExpressVPN Security Team. (2021, November 16). Cybersecurity lessons: A PATH vulnerability in Windows. Retrieved September 28, 2023. ↩

  3. Nischay Hegde and Siddartha Malladi. (2023, July 12). PoC Exploit: Fake Proof of Concept with Backdoor Malware. Retrieved September 28, 2023. ↩

  4. Vivek Gite. (2023, August 22). MacOS – Set / Change $PATH Variable Command. Retrieved September 28, 2023. ↩

  5. Beechey, J.. (2014, November 18). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014. ↩

  6. Gorzelany, A., Hall, J., Poggemeyer, L.. (2019, January 7). Windows Defender Application Control. Retrieved July 16, 2019. ↩

  7. Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016. ↩

  8. NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016. ↩

  9. Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P.. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014. ↩

  10. Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016. ↩

  11. Kanthak, S.. (2016, July 20). Vulnerability and Exploit Detector. Retrieved February 3, 2017. ↩

  12. Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved September 12, 2024. ↩

  13. PowerShellMafia. (2012, May 26). PowerSploit - A PowerShell Post-Exploitation Framework. Retrieved February 6, 2018. ↩

  14. PowerSploit. (n.d.). PowerSploit. Retrieved February 6, 2018. ↩

  15. Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016. ↩

  16. Adi Zeligson & Rotem Kerner. (2018, November 13). Enter The DarkGate - New Cryptocurrency Mining and Ransomware Campaign. Retrieved February 9, 2024. ↩