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T1560.002 Archive via Library

An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party libraries. Many libraries exist that can archive data, including Python rarfile 3, libzip 1, and zlib 2. Most libraries include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data.

Some archival libraries are preinstalled on systems, such as bzip2 on macOS and Linux, and zip on Windows. Note that the libraries are different from the utilities. The libraries can be linked against when compiling, while the utilities require spawning a subshell, or a similar execution mechanism.

Item Value
ID T1560.002
Sub-techniques T1560.001, T1560.002, T1560.003
Tactics TA0009
Platforms Linux, Windows, macOS
Version 1.0
Created 20 February 2020
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0642 BADFLICK BADFLICK has compressed data using the aPLib compression library.14
S0127 BBSRAT BBSRAT can compress data with ZLIB prior to sending it back to the C2 server.8
S0348 Cardinal RAT Cardinal RAT applies compression to C2 traffic using the ZLIB library.15
S0354 Denis Denis compressed collected data using zlib.12
S0091 Epic Epic compresses the collected data with bzip2 before sending it to the C2 server.13
S0661 FoggyWeb FoggyWeb can invoke the Common.Compress method to compress data with the C# GZipStream compression class.18
S1044 FunnyDream FunnyDream has compressed collected files with zLib.19
S0260 InvisiMole InvisiMole can use zlib to compress and decompress data.910
G0032 Lazarus Group Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is compressed with Zlib, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.2021
S1141 LunarWeb LunarWeb can zlib-compress data prior to exfiltration.6
S0352 OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D scrambles and encrypts data using AES256 before sending it to the C2 server.1617
S0053 SeaDuke SeaDuke compressed data with zlib prior to sending it over C2.11
S0467 TajMahal TajMahal has the ability to use the open source libraries XZip/Xunzip and zlib to compress files.5
G0027 Threat Group-3390 Threat Group-3390 has used RAR to compress, encrypt, and password-protect files prior to exfiltration.22
S0086 ZLib The ZLib backdoor compresses communications using the standard Zlib compression library.7

References

  1. D. Baron, T. Klausner. (2020). libzip. Retrieved February 20, 2020. ↩

  2. madler. (2017). zlib. Retrieved February 20, 2020. ↩

  3. mkz. (2020). rarfile 3.1. Retrieved February 20, 2020. ↩

  4. Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016. ↩

  5. GReAT. (2019, April 10). Project TajMahal – a sophisticated new APT framework. Retrieved October 14, 2019. ↩

  6. Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024. ↩

  7. Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021. ↩

  8. Lee, B. Grunzweig, J. (2015, December 22). BBSRAT Attacks Targeting Russian Organizations Linked to Roaming Tiger. Retrieved August 19, 2016. ↩

  9. Hromcová, Z. (2018, June 07). InvisiMole: Surprisingly equipped spyware, undercover since 2013. Retrieved July 10, 2018. ↩

  10. Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020. ↩

  11. Dunwoody, M. and Carr, N.. (2016, September 27). No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016. Retrieved September 12, 2024. ↩

  12. Shulmin, A., Yunakovsky, S. (2017, April 28). Use of DNS Tunneling for C&C Communications. Retrieved November 5, 2018. ↩

  13. Kaspersky Lab’s Global Research & Analysis Team. (2014, August 06). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroboros. Retrieved November 7, 2018. ↩

  14. Accenture iDefense Unit. (2019, March 5). Mudcarp’s Focus on Submarine Technologies. Retrieved August 24, 2021. ↩

  15. Grunzweig, J.. (2017, April 20). Cardinal RAT Active for Over Two Years. Retrieved December 8, 2018. ↩

  16. Horejsi, J. (2018, April 04). New MacOS Backdoor Linked to OceanLotus Found. Retrieved November 13, 2018. ↩

  17. Magisa, L. (2020, November 27). New MacOS Backdoor Connected to OceanLotus Surfaces. Retrieved December 2, 2020. ↩

  18. Ramin Nafisi. (2021, September 27). FoggyWeb: Targeted NOBELIUM malware leads to persistent backdoor. Retrieved October 4, 2021. ↩

  19. Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022. ↩

  20. Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Remote Administration Tools & Content Staging Malware Report. Retrieved March 16, 2016. ↩

  21. Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, February 12). Lazarus Resurfaces, Targets Global Banks and Bitcoin Users. Retrieved February 19, 2018. ↩

  22. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, June 27). BRONZE UNION Cyberespionage Persists Despite Disclosures. Retrieved July 13, 2017. ↩