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T1543.001 Launch Agent

Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and ~/Library/LaunchAgents.14 7 Property list files use the Label, ProgramArguments , and RunAtLoad keys to identify the Launch Agent’s name, executable location, and execution time.8 Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.

Launch Agents can also be executed using the Launchctl command.

Adversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the RunAtLoad or KeepAlive keys set to true.25 The Launch Agent name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and execute with user level permissions.63

Item Value
ID T1543.001
Sub-techniques T1543.001, T1543.002, T1543.003, T1543.004, T1543.005
Tactics TA0003, TA0004
Platforms macOS
Version 1.5
Created 17 January 2020
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0482 Bundlore Bundlore can persist via a LaunchAgent.20
S0274 Calisto Calisto adds a .plist file to the /Library/LaunchAgents folder to maintain persistence.10
S0369 CoinTicker CoinTicker creates user launch agents named .espl.plist and com.apple.[random string].plist to establish persistence.24
G1052 Contagious Interview Contagious Interview has established persistence using InvisibleFerret malware to create file to run the script on Startup via LaunchAgents.23 Contagious Interview has also utilized a plist file located in /Library/LaunchAgents to enable a malicious bash script the ability to persist.32
S0492 CookieMiner CookieMiner has installed multiple new Launch Agents in order to maintain persistence for cryptocurrency mining software.29
S0235 CrossRAT CrossRAT creates a Launch Agent on macOS.12
S1153 Cuckoo Stealer Cuckoo Stealer can achieve persistence by creating launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads.2728
S0497 Dacls Dacls can establish persistence via a LaunchAgent.1415
S0281 Dok Dok installs two LaunchAgents to redirect all network traffic with a randomly generated name for each plist file maintaining the format com.random.name.plist.1113
S0277 FruitFly FruitFly persists via a Launch Agent.11
S0690 Green Lambert Green Lambert can create a Launch Agent with the RunAtLoad key-value pair set to true, ensuring the com.apple.GrowlHelper.plist file runs every time a user logs in.2526
S1245 InvisibleFerret InvisibleFerret has established persistence using LaunchAgents on macOS that run on Startup using a file named “com.avatar.update.wake.plist”.23
S0276 Keydnap Keydnap uses a Launch Agent to persist.31
S0162 Komplex The Komplex trojan creates a persistent launch agent called with $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.updates.plist with launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.updates.plist.2
S1016 MacMa MacMa installs a com.apple.softwareupdate.plist file in the /LaunchAgents folder with the RunAtLoad value set to true. Upon user login, MacMa is executed from /var/root/.local/softwareupdate with root privileges. Some variations also include the LimitLoadToSessionType key with the value Aqua, ensuring the MacMa only runs when there is a logged in GUI user.1617
S1048 macOS.OSAMiner macOS.OSAMiner has placed a Stripped Payloads with a plist extension in the Launch Agent’s folder. 22
S0282 MacSpy MacSpy persists via a Launch Agent.11
S0198 NETWIRE NETWIRE can use launch agents for persistence.30
S0352 OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can create a persistence file in the folder /Library/LaunchAgents.1819
S0279 Proton Proton persists via Launch Agent.11
S0595 ThiefQuest ThiefQuest installs a launch item using an embedded encrypted launch agent property list template. The plist file is installed in the ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ folder and configured with the path to the persistent binary located in the ~/Library/ folder.21

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1022 Restrict File and Directory Permissions Set group policies to restrict file permissions to the ~/launchagents folder.9

References

  1. Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017. ↩

  2. Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy’s ‘Komplex’ OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. ↩↩

  3. Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017. ↩

  4. Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017. ↩

  5. Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. ↩

  6. Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let’s Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved November 17, 2024. ↩

  7. Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017. ↩

  8. Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017. ↩

  9. Antonio Piazza (4n7m4n). (2021, November 23). Defeating Malicious Launch Persistence. Retrieved April 19, 2022. ↩

  10. Kuzin, M., Zelensky S. (2018, July 20). Calisto Trojan for macOS. Retrieved September 7, 2018. ↩

  11. Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Mac Malware of 2017. Retrieved September 21, 2018. ↩↩↩↩

  12. Blaich, A., et al. (2018, January 18). Dark Caracal: Cyber-espionage at a Global Scale. Retrieved April 11, 2018. ↩

  13. Ofer Caspi. (2017, May 4). OSX Malware is Catching Up, and it wants to Read Your HTTPS Traffic. Retrieved October 5, 2021. ↩

  14. Stokes, P. (2020, July 27). Four Distinct Families of Lazarus Malware Target Apple’s macOS Platform. Retrieved August 7, 2020. ↩

  15. Mabutas, G. (2020, May 11). New MacOS Dacls RAT Backdoor Shows Lazarus’ Multi-Platform Attack Capability. Retrieved August 10, 2020. ↩

  16. M.Léveillé, M., Cherepanov, A.. (2022, January 25). Watering hole deploys new macOS malware, DazzleSpy, in Asia. Retrieved May 6, 2022. ↩

  17. Wardle, P. (2021, November 11). OSX.CDDS (OSX.MacMa). Retrieved June 30, 2022. ↩

  18. Horejsi, J. (2018, April 04). New MacOS Backdoor Linked to OceanLotus Found. Retrieved November 13, 2018. ↩

  19. Magisa, L. (2020, November 27). New MacOS Backdoor Connected to OceanLotus Surfaces. Retrieved December 2, 2020. ↩

  20. Sushko, O. (2019, April 17). macOS Bundlore: Mac Virus Bypassing macOS Security Features. Retrieved June 30, 2020. ↩

  21. Patrick Wardle. (2020, June 29). OSX.EvilQuest Uncovered part i: infection, persistence, and more!. Retrieved March 18, 2021. ↩

  22. Phil Stokes. (2021, January 11). FADE DEAD | Adventures in Reversing Malicious Run-Only AppleScripts. Retrieved September 29, 2022. ↩

  23. Seongsu Park. (2024, November 4). From Pyongyang to Your Payroll: The Rise of North Korean Remote Workers in the West. Retrieved October 17, 2025. ↩↩

  24. Thomas Reed. (2018, October 29). Mac cryptocurrency ticker app installs backdoors. Retrieved April 23, 2019. ↩

  25. Sandvik, Runa. (2021, October 1). Made In America: Green Lambert for OS X. Retrieved March 21, 2022. ↩

  26. Sandvik, Runa. (2021, October 18). Green Lambert and ATT&CK. Retrieved November 17, 2024. ↩

  27. Kohler, A. and Lopez, C. (2024, April 30). Malware: Cuckoo Behaves Like Cross Between Infostealer and Spyware. Retrieved August 20, 2024. ↩

  28. Stokes, P. (2024, May 9). macOS Cuckoo Stealer | Ensuring Detection and Defense as New Samples Rapidly Emerge. Retrieved August 20, 2024. ↩

  29. Chen, y., et al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved July 22, 2020. ↩

  30. Lambert, T. (2020, January 29). Intro to Netwire. Retrieved January 7, 2021. ↩

  31. Patrick Wardle. (2017, January 1). Mac Malware of 2016. Retrieved September 21, 2018. ↩

  32. Amaury G., Coline Chavane, Felix Aimé and Sekoia TDR. (2025, March 31). From Contagious to ClickFake Interview: Lazarus leveraging the ClickFix tactic. Retrieved April 1, 2025. ↩