T1070 Indicator Removal
Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated within systems to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses. Various artifacts may be created by an adversary or something that can be attributed to an adversary’s actions. Typically these artifacts are used as defensive indicators related to monitored events, such as strings from downloaded files, logs that are generated from user actions, and other data analyzed by defenders. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often specific to each platform.
Removal of these indicators may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other processes used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.
Item | Value |
---|---|
ID | T1070 |
Sub-techniques | T1070.001, T1070.002, T1070.003, T1070.004, T1070.005, T1070.006, T1070.007, T1070.008, T1070.009 |
Tactics | TA0005 |
Platforms | Containers, Google Workspace, Linux, Network, Office 365, Windows, macOS |
Version | 2.1 |
Created | 31 May 2017 |
Last Modified | 11 April 2023 |
Procedure Examples
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
S0239 | Bankshot | Bankshot deletes all artifacts associated with the malware from the infected machine.15 |
S0089 | BlackEnergy | BlackEnergy has removed the watermark associated with enabling the TESTSIGNING boot configuration option by removing the relevant strings in the user32.dll.mui of the system.14 |
S0527 | CSPY Downloader | CSPY Downloader has the ability to remove values it writes to the Registry.1 |
S0673 | DarkWatchman | DarkWatchman can uninstall malicious components from the Registry, stop processes, and clear the browser history.11 |
S0695 | Donut | Donut can erase file references to payloads in-memory after being reflectively loaded and executed.2 |
S0568 | EVILNUM | EVILNUM has a function called “DeleteLeftovers” to remove certain artifacts of the attack.16 |
S0696 | Flagpro | Flagpro can close specific Windows Security and Internet Explorer dialog boxes to mask external connections.21 |
S1044 | FunnyDream | FunnyDream has the ability to clean traces of malware deployment.19 |
S0697 | HermeticWiper | HermeticWiper can disable pop-up information about folders and desktop items and delete Registry keys to hide malicious services.98 |
G0032 | Lazarus Group | Lazarus Group has restored malicious KernelCallbackTable code to its original state after the process execution flow has been hijacked.22 |
S0449 | Maze | Maze has used the “Wow64RevertWow64FsRedirection” function following attempts to delete the shadow volumes, in order to leave the system in the same state as it was prior to redirection.7 |
S0455 | Metamorfo | Metamorfo has a command to delete a Registry key it uses, \Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\notes .6 |
S0691 | Neoichor | Neoichor can clear the browser history on a compromised host by changing the ClearBrowsingHistoryOnExit value to 1 in the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Privacy Registry key.5 |
S0229 | Orz | Orz can overwrite Registry settings to reduce its visibility on the victim.10 |
S0448 | Rising Sun | Rising Sun can clear a memory blog in the process by overwriting it with junk bytes.12 |
S0461 | SDBbot | SDBbot has the ability to clean up and remove data structures from a compromised host.20 |
S0596 | ShadowPad | ShadowPad has deleted arbitrary Registry values.17 |
S0589 | Sibot | Sibot will delete an associated registry key if a certain server response is received.18 |
S0692 | SILENTTRINITY | SILENTTRINITY can remove artifacts from the compromised host, including created Registry keys.3 |
C0024 | SolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 temporarily replaced legitimate utilities with their own, executed their payload, and then restored the original file.23 |
S0603 | Stuxnet | Stuxnet can delete OLE Automation and SQL stored procedures used to store malicious payloads.13 |
S0559 | SUNBURST | SUNBURST removed HTTP proxy registry values to clean up traces of execution.4 |
Mitigations
ID | Mitigation | Description |
---|---|---|
M1041 | Encrypt Sensitive Information | Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary. |
M1029 | Remote Data Storage | Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system. |
M1022 | Restrict File and Directory Permissions | Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication and limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by preventing Privilege Escalation opportunities. |
Detection
ID | Data Source | Data Component |
---|---|---|
DS0015 | Application Log | Application Log Content |
DS0017 | Command | Command Execution |
DS0022 | File | File Deletion |
DS0018 | Firewall | Firewall Rule Modification |
DS0029 | Network Traffic | Network Traffic Content |
DS0009 | Process | OS API Execution |
DS0003 | Scheduled Job | Scheduled Job Modification |
DS0002 | User Account | User Account Authentication |
DS0024 | Windows Registry | Windows Registry Key Deletion |
References
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Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022. ↩
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Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved. 2017/09/22 ↩
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F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016. ↩
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US-CERT. (2017, December 13). Malware Analysis Report (MAR) - 10135536-B. Retrieved July 17, 2018. ↩
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Kaspersky Lab. (2017, August). ShadowPad: popular server management software hit in supply chain attack. Retrieved March 22, 2021. ↩
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Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021. ↩
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Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022. ↩
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Schwarz, D. et al. (2019, October 16). TA505 Distributes New SDBbot Remote Access Trojan with Get2 Downloader. Retrieved May 29, 2020. ↩
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Hada, H. (2021, December 28). Flagpro The new malware used by BlackTech. Retrieved March 25, 2022. ↩
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Saini, A. and Hossein, J. (2022, January 27). North Korea’s Lazarus APT leverages Windows Update client, GitHub in latest campaign. Retrieved January 27, 2022. ↩
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FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021. ↩