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T1055.002 Portable Executable Injection

Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

PE injection is commonly performed by copying code (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address space of the target process before invoking it via a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread or additional code (ex: shellcode). The displacement of the injected code does introduce the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. 1

Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process’s memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.

Item Value
ID T1055.002
Sub-techniques T1055.001, T1055.002, T1055.003, T1055.004, T1055.005, T1055.008, T1055.009, T1055.011, T1055.012, T1055.013, T1055.014, T1055.015
Tactics TA0005, TA0004
Platforms Windows
Version 1.2
Created 14 January 2020
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
C0057 3CX Supply Chain Attack During the 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus uses the SigFlip tool to inject arbitrary code without affecting or breaking the file’s signature.1514
S1063 Brute Ratel C4 Brute Ratel C4 has injected Latrodectus into the Explorer.exe process on comrpomised hosts.2
S0030 Carbanak Carbanak downloads an executable and injects it directly into a new process.5
S1158 DUSTPAN DUSTPAN can inject its decrypted payload into another process.9
S1138 Gootloader
Gootloader can use its own PE loader to execute payloads in memory.7
G0078 Gorgon Group Gorgon Group malware can download a remote access tool, ShiftyBug, and inject into another process.13
S0342 GreyEnergy GreyEnergy has a module to inject a PE binary into a remote process.8
S1229 Havoc Havoc has itself injected into C:\\Windows\\System32\\Werfault.exe on targeted systems.4
S0260 InvisiMole InvisiMole can inject its backdoor as a portable executable into a target process.3
S0681 Lizar Lizar can execute PE files in the address space of the specified process.6
S1145 Pikabot Pikabot, following payload decryption, creates a process hard-coded into the dropped (e.g., WerFault.exe) and injects the decrypted core modules into it.10
G0106 Rocke Rocke’s miner, “TermsHost.exe”, evaded defenses by injecting itself into Windows processes, including Notepad.exe.12
S0330 Zeus Panda Zeus Panda checks processes on the system and if they meet the necessary requirements, it injects into that process.11

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1040 Behavior Prevention on Endpoint Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process.

References

  1. Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017. ↩

  2. Elkins, T. (2024, July 24). Malware Campaign Lures Users With Fake W2 Form. Retrieved September 13, 2024. ↩

  3. Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020. ↩

  4. Ungur, P. (n.d.). HAVOC. Retrieved August 4, 2025. ↩

  5. Bennett, J., Vengerik, B. (2017, June 12). Behind the CARBANAK Backdoor. Retrieved June 11, 2018. ↩

  6. BI.ZONE Cyber Threats Research Team. (2021, May 13). From pentest to APT attack: cybercriminal group FIN7 disguises its malware as an ethical hacker’s toolkit. Retrieved February 2, 2022. ↩

  7. Szappanos, G. & Brandt, A. (2021, March 1). “Gootloader” expands its payload delivery options. Retrieved September 30, 2022. ↩

  8. Cherepanov, A. (2018, October). GREYENERGY A successor to BlackEnergy. Retrieved November 15, 2018. ↩

  9. Mike Stokkel et al. (2024, July 18). APT41 Has Arisen From the DUST. Retrieved September 16, 2024. ↩

  10. Brett Stone-Gross & Nikolaos Pantazopoulos. (2023, May 24). Technical Analysis of Pikabot. Retrieved July 12, 2024. ↩

  11. Ebach, L. (2017, June 22). Analysis Results of Zeus.Variant.Panda. Retrieved November 5, 2018. ↩

  12. Liebenberg, D.. (2018, August 30). Rocke: The Champion of Monero Miners. Retrieved May 26, 2020. ↩

  13. Falcone, R., et al. (2018, August 02). The Gorgon Group: Slithering Between Nation State and Cybercrime. Retrieved August 7, 2018. ↩

  14. Jeff Johnson, Fred Plan, Adrian Sanchez, Renato Fontana, Jake Nicastro, Dimiter Andonov, Marius Fodoreanu, Daniel Scott. (2023, April 20). 3CX Software Supply Chain Compromise Initiated by a Prior Software Supply Chain Compromise; Suspected North Korean Actor Responsible. Retrieved August 25, 2025. ↩

  15. Mohamed El Azaar (med0x2e), TimWhite (timwhitez). (2023, August 28). GitHub SigFlip. Retrieved September 30, 2025. ↩