T1098.003 Additional Cloud Roles
An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments.3462 With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).1 2
This account modification may immediately follow Create Account or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing Valid Accounts that they have compromised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularly if the roles added allow for lateral movement to additional accounts.
For example, in AWS environments, an adversary with appropriate permissions may be able to use the CreatePolicyVersion API to define a new version of an IAM policy or the AttachUserPolicy API to attach an IAM policy with additional or distinct permissions to a compromised user account.7
In some cases, adversaries may add roles to adversary-controlled accounts outside the victim cloud tenant. This allows these external accounts to perform actions inside the victim tenant without requiring the adversary to Create Account or modify a victim-owned account.5
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| ID | T1098.003 |
| Sub-techniques | T1098.001, T1098.002, T1098.003, T1098.004, T1098.005, T1098.006, T1098.007 |
| Tactics | TA0003, TA0004 |
| Platforms | IaaS, Identity Provider, Office Suite, SaaS |
| Version | 2.5 |
| Created | 19 January 2020 |
| Last Modified | 24 October 2025 |
Procedure Examples
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| C0027 | C0027 | During C0027, Scattered Spider used IAM manipulation to gain persistence and to assume or elevate privileges.12 |
| G1004 | LAPSUS$ | LAPSUS$ has added the global admin role to accounts they have created in the targeted organization’s cloud instances.10 |
| G1015 | Scattered Spider | Scattered Spider has assigned user access admin roles in order to gain Tenant Root Group management permissions in Azure.9 |
| C0024 | SolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 granted company administrator privileges to a newly created service principle.13 |
| G1053 | Storm-0501 | Storm-0501 has elevated their access to Azure resources using Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action and Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write operations to gain User Access Administrator and Owner Azure roles over the victims’ Azure subscriptions.11 |
Mitigations
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1032 | Multi-factor Authentication | Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. |
| M1026 | Privileged Account Management | Ensure that all accounts use the least privileges they require. In Azure AD environments, consider using Privileged Identity Management (PIM) to define roles that require two or more approvals before assignment to users.8 |
| M1018 | User Account Management | Ensure that low-privileged user accounts do not have permissions to add permissions to accounts or update IAM policies. |
References
-
Brian Bahtiarian, David Blanton, Britton Manahan and Kyle Pellett. (2022, April 5). Incident report: From CLI to console, chasing an attacker in AWS. Retrieved April 7, 2022. ↩
-
Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et. al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019. ↩↩
-
AWS. (n.d.). Policies and permissions in IAM. Retrieved April 1, 2022. ↩
-
Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Understanding policies. Retrieved April 1, 2022. ↩
-
Invictus Incident Response. (2024, January 31). The curious case of DangerDev@protonmail.me. Retrieved March 19, 2024. ↩
-
Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019. ↩
-
Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022. ↩
-
Microsoft. (2023, January 30). Approve or deny requests for Azure AD roles in Privileged Identity Management. Retrieved February 21, 2023. ↩
-
Microsoft. (2023, October 25). Octo Tempest crosses boundaries to facilitate extortion, encryption, and destruction. Retrieved March 18, 2024. ↩
-
MSTIC, DART, M365 Defender. (2022, March 24). DEV-0537 Criminal Actor Targeting Organizations for Data Exfiltration and Destruction. Retrieved May 17, 2022. ↩
-
Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2025, August 27). Storm-0501’s evolving techniques lead to cloud-based ransomware. Retrieved October 19, 2025. ↩
-
Parisi, T. (2022, December 2). Not a SIMulation: CrowdStrike Investigations Reveal Intrusion Campaign Targeting Telco and BPO Companies. Retrieved June 30, 2023. ↩
-
CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022. ↩