T0856 Spoof Reporting Message
Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control system environments for evasion and to impair process control. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. Reporting messages are important for monitoring the normal operation of a system or identifying important events such as deviations from expected values.
If an adversary has the ability to Spoof Reporting Messages, they can impact the control system in many ways. The adversary can Spoof Reporting Messages that state that the process is operating normally, as a form of evasion. The adversary could also Spoof Reporting Messages to make the defenders and operators think that other errors are occurring in order to distract them from the actual source of a problem. 1
Item | Value |
---|---|
ID | T0856 |
Sub-techniques | |
Tactics | TA0103, TA0106 |
Platforms | Control Server |
Version | 1.2 |
Created | 21 May 2020 |
Last Modified | 30 March 2023 |
Procedure Examples
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
C0020 | Maroochy Water Breach | In the Maroochy Water Breach, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer.6 |
Mitigations
ID | Mitigation | Description |
---|---|---|
M0802 | Communication Authenticity | Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e.g., legacy controllers, RTUs). |
M0937 | Filter Network Traffic | Perform inline allowlisting of automation protocol commands to prevent devices from sending unauthorized command or reporting messages. Allow/denylist techniques need to be designed with sufficient accuracy to prevent the unintended blocking of valid reporting messages. |
M0807 | Network Allowlists | Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. 2 |
M0930 | Network Segmentation | Segment operational assets and their management devices based on their functional role within the process. Enabling more strict isolation to more critical control and operational information within the control environment. 3 4 2 5 |
M0813 | Software Process and Device Authentication | Devices should authenticate all messages between master and outstation assets. |
Detection
ID | Data Source | Data Component |
---|---|---|
DS0029 | Network Traffic | Network Traffic Content |
DS0040 | Operational Databases | Device Alarm |
DS0024 | Windows Registry | Windows Registry Key Modification |
References
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Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2018/01/12 ↩
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Department of Homeland Security 2016, September Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ↩↩
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Karen Scarfone; Paul Hoffman 2009, September Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ↩
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Keith Stouffer 2015, May Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2018/03/28 ↩
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Dwight Anderson 2014 Protect Critical Infrastructure Systems With Whitelisting Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ↩
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Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 ↩