M1015 Active Directory Configuration
Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use SID Filtering, etc.
Item | Value |
---|---|
ID | M1015 |
Version | 1.1 |
Created | 06 June 2019 |
Last Modified | 29 May 2020 |
Navigation Layer | View In ATT&CK® Navigator |
Techniques Addressed by Mitigation
Domain | ID | Name | Use |
---|---|---|---|
enterprise | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation | - |
enterprise | T1134.005 | SID-History Injection | Clean up SID-History attributes after legitimate account migration is complete. |
enterprise | T1606 | Forge Web Credentials | - |
enterprise | T1606.002 | SAML Tokens | For containing the impact of a previously forged SAML token, rotate the token-signing AD FS certificate in rapid succession twice, which will invalidate any tokens generated using the previous certificate.6 |
enterprise | T1003 | OS Credential Dumping | |
Manage the access control list for “Replicating Directory Changes” and other permissions associated with domain controller replication. 13 12 Consider adding users to the “Protected Users” Active Directory security group. This can help limit the caching of users’ plaintext credentials.10 | |||
enterprise | T1003.005 | Cached Domain Credentials | Consider adding users to the “Protected Users” Active Directory security group. This can help limit the caching of users’ plaintext credentials.10 |
enterprise | T1003.006 | DCSync | Manage the access control list for “Replicating Directory Changes” and other permissions associated with domain controller replication.1112 |
enterprise | T1072 | Software Deployment Tools | Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of group policy. |
enterprise | T1649 | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates | Ensure certificate authorities (CA) are properly secured, including treating CA servers (and other resources hosting CA certificates) as tier 0 assets. Harden abusable CA settings and attributes. |
enterprise | T1558 | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | For containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it. For each domain, change the KRBTGT account password once, force replication, and then change the password a second time. Consider rotating the KRBTGT account password every 180 days.8 |
enterprise | T1558.001 | Golden Ticket | For containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it. For each domain, change the KRBTGT account password once, force replication, and then change the password a second time. Consider rotating the KRBTGT account password every 180 days.8 |
enterprise | T1552 | Unsecured Credentials | Remove vulnerable Group Policy Preferences.5 |
enterprise | T1552.006 | Group Policy Preferences | Remove vulnerable Group Policy Preferences.5 |
enterprise | T1550 | Use Alternate Authentication Material | - |
enterprise | T1550.003 | Pass the Ticket | To contain the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it.9 For each domain, change the KRBTGT account password once, force replication, and then change the password a second time. Consider rotating the KRBTGT account password every 180 days.8 |
enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts | Disable legacy authentication, which does not support MFA, and require the use of modern authentication protocols instead. |
enterprise | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts | Disable legacy authentication, which does not support MFA, and require the use of modern authentication protocols instead. |
References
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Microsoft. (2014, November 19). Security Considerations for Trusts. Retrieved November 30, 2017. ↩
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Microsoft. (n.d.). Configuring SID Filter Quarantining on External Trusts. Retrieved November 30, 2017. ↩
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Microsoft. (2012, September 11). Command-Line Reference - Netdom Trust. Retrieved November 30, 2017. ↩
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Metcalf, S. (2015, August 7). Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now More Golden. Retrieved December 1, 2017. ↩
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Microsoft. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: Vulnerability in Group Policy Preferences could allow elevation of privilege. Retrieved January 28, 2015. ↩↩
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Mandiant. (2021, January 19). Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452. Retrieved January 22, 2021. ↩
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Schroeder, W. & Christensen, L. (2021, June 22). Certified Pre-Owned - Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services. Retrieved August 2, 2022. ↩
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UCF. (n.d.). The password for the krbtgt account on a domain must be reset at least every 180 days. Retrieved November 5, 2020. ↩↩↩
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Sean Metcalf. (2014, November 10). Kerberos & KRBTGT: Active Directory’s Domain Kerberos Service Account. Retrieved January 30, 2020. ↩
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Microsoft. (2016, October 12). Protected Users Security Group. Retrieved May 29, 2020. ↩↩
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Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved August 7, 2017. ↩
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Microsoft. (n.d.). How to grant the “Replicating Directory Changes” permission for the Microsoft Metadirectory Services ADMA service account. Retrieved December 4, 2017. ↩↩
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Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017. ↩