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C0018 C0018

C0018 was a month-long ransomware intrusion that successfully deployed AvosLocker onto a compromised network. The unidentified actors gained initial access to the victim network through an exposed server and used a variety of open-source tools prior to executing AvosLocker.12

Item Value
ID C0018
Associated Names
First Seen February 2022
Last Seen March 2022
Version 1.0
Created 17 January 2023
Last Modified 14 February 2023
Navigation Layer View In ATT&CK® Navigator

Techniques Used

Domain ID Name Use
enterprise T1071 Application Layer Protocol -
enterprise T1071.001 Web Protocols During C0018, the threat actors used HTTP for C2 communications.1
enterprise T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter -
enterprise T1059.001 PowerShell During C0018, the threat actors used encoded PowerShell scripts for execution.21
enterprise T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact During C0018, the threat actors used AvosLocker ransomware to encrypt files on the compromised network.21
enterprise T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application During C0018, the threat actors exploited VMWare Horizon Unified Access Gateways that were vulnerable to several Log4Shell vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, CVE-2021-45105, and CVE-2021-44832.2
enterprise T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer During C0018, the threat actors downloaded additional tools, such as Mimikatz and Sliver, as well as Cobalt Strike and AvosLocker ransomware onto the victim network.21
enterprise T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer During C0018, the threat actors transferred the SoftPerfect Network Scanner and other tools to machines in the network using AnyDesk and PDQ Deploy.21
enterprise T1036 Masquerading During C0018, AvosLocker was disguised using the victim company name as the filename.2
enterprise T1036.005 Match Legitimate Name or Location For C0018, the threat actors renamed a Sliver payload to vmware_kb.exe.2
enterprise T1046 Network Service Discovery During C0018, the threat actors used the SoftPerfect Network Scanner for network scanning.2
enterprise T1571 Non-Standard Port During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892, to establish RDP connections.1
enterprise T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information -
enterprise T1027.010 Command Obfuscation During C0018, the threat actors used Base64 to encode their PowerShell scripts.21
enterprise T1588 Obtain Capabilities -
enterprise T1588.002 Tool For C0018, the threat actors acquired a variety of open source tools, including Mimikatz, Sliver, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, AnyDesk, and PDQ Deploy.21
enterprise T1219 Remote Access Software During C0018, the threat actors used AnyDesk to transfer tools between systems.21
enterprise T1021 Remote Services -
enterprise T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports to establish RDP connections, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892.1
enterprise T1072 Software Deployment Tools During C0018, the threat actors used PDQ Deploy to move AvosLocker and tools across the network.2
enterprise T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution -
enterprise T1218.011 Rundll32 During C0018, the threat actors used rundll32 to run Mimikatz.1
enterprise T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery During C0018, the threat actors ran nslookup and Advanced IP Scanner on the target network.1
enterprise T1033 System Owner/User Discovery During C0018, the threat actors collected whoami information via PowerShell scripts.1
enterprise T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation During C0018, the threat actors used WMIC to modify administrative settings on both a local and a remote host, likely as part of the first stages for their lateral movement; they also used WMI Provider Host (wmiprvse.exe) to execute a variety of encoded PowerShell scripts using the DownloadString method.21

Software

ID Name Description
S1053 AvosLocker During C0018, the threat actors used AvosLocker ransomware to encrypt the compromised network.12

References